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Executive Summary 
 
The Government has identified key priority industries like cement and steel bars that 
are to be promoted under its Strategy on Industrialization and Modernization (2001-
2020). Others like beer constitute end-user industries that have successfully name-
brand recognition. The importance of those industries to the economy is significant in 
terms of output, employment and linkages to other downstream and/or upstream 
activities. Cement and beer each contribute 10 percent to the total value of industrial 
activity, and steel constitutes over 3 percent of the total. The three industries together 
employ 2,400 persons. Within the construction industry, cement and steel account for 
nearly one-third of value added, which itself represents a third of the country’s total 
industrial production. In promoting the industries, the Government must ensure compliance 
with WTO rules as part of its accession negotiations. To this end, the present study examines 
the implications of Lao PDR’s WTO accessions on the domestic cement, steel bar and 
brewery industries with a view to developing recommendations on how to 
concurrently manage the Government’s domestic strategic objectives with the 
country’s effective involvement in the global economy. 
1. Industry Competitiveness and Growth Potential 
The competitiveness of the cement and steel industries and, to a somewhat lesser 
extent, that of the brewery industry have been undermined by a policy regime that 
imposes considerable barriers to trade and investment, relatively high costs of doing 
business, and exchange rate policies that effectively raise domestic costs relative to 
those of foreign-sourced products.  
Institutional Effectiveness – Apart from resource misallocation caused by non-tariff 
measures in the cement and steel bar industries, the institutional capabilities of the 
public sector needed to effectively promote the industries are low by international 
standards. Notwithstanding recent improvements, Lao PDR’s ranking on government 
effectiveness remains among the lowest in the region, according to the World Bank’s 
latest ratings.  
Business Practices – In business practices, Lao PDR’s ranking is moderate in terms 
of employing workers, tax payments and contract enforcement, but it is low in terms 
of trading across borders, obtaining permits, property registration, credit facilities, and 
operating a business. Lack of access to capital remains one of the most severe 
constraints on businesses operating in the country.  
Real Cross-Rates – The real effective exchange rate of the kip has appreciated in 
recent years relative to the major foreign competitors of the country’s beer, cement 
and steel bar producers. This trend has further undermined the cost differential 
between domestically produced goods and that of competing suppliers from 
neighboring countries. Because consumers are responsive to relative price 
differences between Laotian and foreign suppliers, the demand for domestically 
produced goods has weakened in recent years. Despite a recent beer market survey 
suggesting that consumer preferences for domestic beer are little affected by price 
variations in the short run, a continued erosion of prices differentials over longer 
periods of time would undermine the competitiveness of the brewery industry. 
Similarly, further appreciations of the kip would erode the competitiveness of the 
cement and steel bar industries.  
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Growth Potential of Industries – Lao PDR’s growth potential for steel bars and cement 
is likely to be limited to its domestic market in the medium to long term, while beer 
has a significant potential for exports. 
 In beer, per capita consumption in Laos is currently about one-half of the average for the lower 
quartile of countries that consume alcoholic beverages. Assuming that domestic producers are able 
to maintain their current market shares, the industry could double its existing production level over 
the medium to long run. For exports, the forecast is for an annual expansion of 7 percent. 
 In cement, current per capita consumption in Laos is somewhat over one-half of that in Thailand and 
China. Over the medium to long run, domestic consumption could expand by as much as 90 percent 
over its present level and, if the economy were to become self-sufficient in that sector, production 
could expand by three times its current level.  
 In steel, per capita consumption in Laos is only one-seventh of the world average. Total 
consumption has the potential to grow by six times its current level, and domestic production only 
accounts for less than one-fifth of existing utilization in the economy. The potential for the industry is 
therefore considerable, were it to become competitive and capable of substituting foreign imports. 
2. Non-Tariff Measures 
WTO Context – In negotiating its accession, Laos will be limited in its capacity to promote and 
protect domestic industries. A key guiding principle of WTO is that protection of domestic 
industries should be limited to tariff measures and that non-tariff barriers like quantitative and 
qualitative controls be eliminated or converted to tariffs. These requirements are nonetheless 
subject to exceptions related to balance of payments difficulties, safeguards and other rules. 
For least developed countries (LDCs) like Laos, transitional periods and arrangements are 
provided to enable acceding LDCs to effectively implement commitments and obligations. 
However, those transitional arrangements need to be eliminated within a time period specified 
at the time of the country’s accession. 
Types of Trade Controls –The Government currently imposes three types of control measures 
for cement and steel bar imports. To control the volume of imports, it applies import licensing 
restrictions and quantitative controls on the importation of steel bars for construction and all 
types of cement. To control prices, it applies a maximum price on domestically produced 
cement and steel bars. While the price differentials between domestic and foreign supplies are 
generally stable, exceptions occur when there are sharp market price variations. In those 
cases, administered price adjustments can lag behind market prices by several months, 
causing market distortions and inefficiencies in the allocation of resources. Additionally, under 
the WTO Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, existing controls are under review since 
they can only be applied when other mechanisms are unable to provide the same results.  
Ad Valorem Tariff Equivalents – Measurement of the ad valorem tariff equivalent of non-tariff 
measures involve calculating the so-called price wedge between the border price equivalent of 
a product and its domestic price equivalent, net of the tariff. In practice the c.i.f. price plus 
customs charges and other costs measured in local currency are used to determine the border 
price equivalent, which is then compared with the domestic wholesale price to calculate the 
price wedge. The calculated ad valorem tariff equivalent of NTBs in cement is nearly 11 
percent and that for steel bars is 12 percent. Overall, in cement the non-tariff measures 
account for about two-thirds of the total ad valorem tariff equivalent of both tariffs and NTBs to 
trade, and tariffs account for the remaining one-third. In steel, the non-tariff measures account 
for about 70 of the total ad valorem tariff equivalent of both tariffs and NTBs to trade, and tariffs 
account for the remaining 30 percent. 
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3. Tariff Measures 
MFN Rates - The most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff structure of Laos has been simplified to six 
tariff rates of 5, 10, 15, 20, 30 and 40 percent, and their unweighted average equals 11 
percent. Half of the tariff lines have a 5 percent rate, almost one-third have a 10 percent rate, 
nearly one-tenth percent have a 20 percent rate, and the remaining lines have a 30 or 40 
percent rate. Beer enjoy higher tariff protection (40%), while cement and steel have low duty 
rates (5%) but receive protection in the form of non-tariff measures. Most other ASEAN 
member countries also levy a high tariff on alcoholic beverage imports. Vietnam and Thailand, 
for example, apply a duty rate of 60 percent, while Indonesia applies the same 40 percent duty 
rate as Laos. In cement, three ASEAN member countries protect their industries with higher 
tariff rates than Laos, most notably Vietnam, which levies a 38 percent tariff on its imports of 
cement. Similarly, in steel three ASEAN countries have significantly higher tariffs than Laos, 
while Cambodia’s tariff is modestly higher than that of Laos 
Other Taxes – Excise taxes range from 5 to 90 percent and a 50 percent rate is applied to 
alcoholic beverages. That tax does not distinguish between imported and domestically 
produced goods. A turnover tax based on Tax Law No. 04/NA of 19 February 2005 constitutes 
a general indirect tax on the consumption of goods and services, levied at a rate of 5 or 10 per 
cent, which is collected on imports at customs checkpoints and from wholesalers. A value 
added tax (VAT) will replace the turnover tax, probably in 2010. 
CEPT-AFTA Rates – As a member of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Lao PDR began 
implementation of the AFTA Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme in 1998, and 
in January 2008 it completed a major milestone in the liberalization schedule by reducing 
import duties on 95 percent of products from ASEAN countries to between 0 and 5 percent. 
Beer is subject to a CEPT rate of 40 percent until 2013, 20 percent in 2014, and zero 
thereafter. Cement is subject to a 5 percent rate until 2014 and zero thereafter. Steel bars have 
a CEPT rate of zero percent, effective since 2008. The degree of protection of ASEAN member 
countries within the CEPT scheme is considerably lower. In beer, only Indonesia retained the 
same high tariff rate as Laos, while Brunei and Malaysia have included that product in their 
General Exception list.  
Tariffs on Inputs – The ability to compete both in domestic and international markets is partly 
attributable to production costs, and those costs can be undermined by tariffs on material 
inputs to domestic industries. An assessment of the import tax burden based on the production 
cost coefficients on those tradable goods reveals a considerable cost burden through the 
region: in Laos the cost-of-production weighted average tariff on material inputs for cement is 
7.3 percent, while it is 8.5 percent in Cambodia, 7.7 percent in Vietnam and 7.3 percent in 
Malaysia. In steel, the opposite pattern exists: the cost-of-production weighted average duty 
rates on the material inputs are lower than the unweighted average in Cambodia (5.2% 
weighted average versus 6.1 unweighted average) and Malaysia (4% weighted average versus 
7.3% unweighted average). Only in Laos is the nominal rate of protection (NPR) of 5 percent 
on the industry output the same as the NPR for material inputs. Additionally, the existence of 
tariffs on tradable inputs that are also used in export-oriented industries can create an anti-
export bias. Those industries attempting to export rather than sell in the domestic market 
receive no output tariff protection but must nevertheless pay the protected input costs of 
tradable inputs. While duties on inputs could be offset by a duty-drawback scheme, no such 
system exists in Laos. 
Effective Rates of Protection (ERP) – Although the ERPs for cement and steel bars suggest 
that the amount of protection has been fairly neutral for both industries, the more interesting 
question is how that protection compares with that given by other countries to those same 
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industries. In the case of cement, three countries have significantly higher ERPs than Laos. 
Vietnam in particular protects its cement industry to a far greater degree than Cambodia and 
Thailand, though the latter two countries have higher rates of protection in the industry than 
Laos. In the case of steel, five countries protect their industries to a significantly greater extent 
than Laos. Malaysia, in particular, has a much higher degree of protection than the other 
countries, though Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia and Thailand all protect their industries more 
than Laos. However, it is important to emphasize that these results refer to the protection given 
to the industries through tariffs and exclude the non-tariff measures applied by Laos. 
4. Total Protection to Industries 
Table S.1 summarizes the ad valorem tariff 
equivalents (TEs) of the selected industries. 
Under the present regime, beer receives the 
highest level of protection (110%), followed 
by steel bars (17%) and cement (16%). The 
actual level of effective rate of protection 
(ERP) with the existing tariffs and TEs of the 
non-tariff measures is 62 percent for cement 
and 50 percent for steel bars. Lowering the 
existing tariffs to zero on tradable inputs in 
the cement and steel bar industries would 
increase the ERP on those industries to 84 
percent for cement and 67 percent for steel 
bars. It would also create greater transparency, streamline administrative and bureaucratic 
procedures, and facilitate business practices in the country. 
5. Impact of Alternative Reform Strategies 
As part of the WTO negotiations, Lao PDR is likely to undertake specific reforms of its trade 
regime covering tariff and non-tariff measures impacting on the selected industries covered by 
this study. We have examined the transformation of non-tariff measures to ad valorem tariff 
equivalents, and assessed the impact of alternative tariff reform strategies on the beer, cement 
and steel bar industries in terms of various performance indicators, including those related to 
the industry, government tax revenue, and employment effects. Table S.2 summarizes the 
results. 
Impact on Effective Rates of Protection – With a multi-tiered system that applies the actual tariff 
plus tariff equivalent (TE) of NTBs with zero duties on tradable inputs, the ERP for cement 
would increase from its existing level of 62 percent to 84 percent; for steel bars it would 
increase from 50 percent to 67 percent. In contrast, the use of a uniform tariff that applied the 
same tariffs plus TEs to both outputs and inputs would lower the ERPs to 46 percent for 
cement and 23 percent for steel bars. Even though the tariffs on inputs and outputs are the 
same under a uniform tariff, the ERP is positive since input tariffs only cover a portion of total 
production costs, the remaining costs being attributable to non-tradables. The implication of 
these findings is that protection of the cement and steel bar industries is more effective under a 
multi-tier system in which tariffs on tradable inputs are eliminated and the ad valorem 
equivalent tariff is applied to existing non-tariff measures. 
Impact on Production and Employment – A uniform tariff equal to the existing tariff and ad 
valorem tariff equivalents of NTBs applied across the board to both inputs and outputs would 
increase production by 9 percent, whereas a multi-tiered tariff system with the same tariff 
Table S.1: Tariffs and Ad Valorem Tariff Equivalent of 
NTBs in Selected Industries, Applied to ERP Estimates 
  Beer Cement 
Steel 
Bars 
Tariff 40% 5% 5% 
Excise Tax 50% 0% 0% 
Tariff + Excise Tax 1/ 110% 5% 5% 
Non-tariff barriers to trade 0% 11% 12% 
Total Ad Valorem Tariff 
Equivalent 110% 16% 17% 
Effective Rates 
of Protection 
Ad Valorem 
Tariffs 
Equivalents of 
NTBs 
With Existing 
Duties on 
Tradable 
Inputs 
na 62% 50% 
With Zero  
Duties on 
Tradable 
Inputs 
na 84% 67% 
1/ Calculated as t + (1+t)e, where t=tariff and e=excise tax. 
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equivalents on outputs but a zero tariff on inputs would increase output by 17 percent. The 
reason for this difference is that output price rises would increase the quantity supplied by that 
same amount without inducing any shifts in supply caused by a cost increase. For the portion 
of beer that is exported, a graduated tariff system would not have any effect on exports since 
the producer would not receive protection in the output market, that is, the international market, 
while input prices would be free of duties in the proposed scheme. In the case of a uniform 
tariff, however, the increased input prices would have a negative effect on production and 
output would contract significantly. Since fixed factor input coefficients are assumed to exist in 
the short to medium term in all three industries, changes employments levels associated with 
these reforms would be proportional to the estimates changes in production volumes. 
Impact on Government Revenue – Existing duty and excise taxes on beer generate about 
US$1.4 million in revenue, while the duty on cement and steel bar imports provides over 
US$5.0 million in revenue. The conversion of non-tariff measures to ad valorem tariffs would 
add another 11 and 12 percentage points to the duty rates on cement and steel bars. Trade tax 
revenue would not, however, rise by that full amount since the increase in trade taxes would 
reduce the volume of cement and steel rods imported. Although trade taxes would not increase 
by the same proportion as the rise in duty rates, they would nonetheless produce an additional 
US$10.8 million in revenue. The conversion of non-tariff measures would also reduce the 
administrative costs of managing those non-tariff measures and free government officials to 
engage in other activities.  
6. Conclusions 
Arguments for Protecting Selected Industries – Protection of the construction industry and, in 
large part, that of the brewery industry is largely based on the need for Laos to catch up in its 
transition to a market economy and therefore provide infant-industry protection to those 
industries. That adjustment process has been envisioned under the WTO as it relates to LDCs 
and justifies protection during limited, time-bound period for certain industries. It recognizes 
that trade protection can affect the performance of domestic firms by influencing the 
competitive pressures that these firms face and the size of the market in which they operate. 
Article XVIII provides for wide ranging government actions to help protect and encourage infant 
industries, subject to consultation and notification of WTO members. 
Arguments for Liberalizing Selected Industries – Continued protection of inefficient industries 
prevents Laos from exploiting its comparative advantage in labor and resource-intensive 
manufactures since it leads to movement of resources away from such activities. Moreover, the 
presence of trade distortions causes investment to focus on non-competitive activities, leading 
to a decline in returns to investment over time and compromising future output growth. There is 
Table S.2: Effect of Alternative Tariff Reform Strategies 
  Beer Cement Steel Bars 
  
Tariff 
Escalation 2/ 
Uniform 
Tariff 
Tariff 
Escalation 
Uniform 
Tariff 
Tariff 
Escalation 
Uniform 
Tariff 
NRP on Outputs 110% 110% 18% 18% 15% 15% 
NRP on Inputs 0% 110% 0% 18% 0% 15% 
Effective Rate of Protection 1/  na na 101% 55% 59% 20% 
Change in  Imports (from free trade) 2/ -26% -13% -11% -8% -12% -5% 
Government Revenue from NTB Tariffication3/ na 10% 12% 
Total Government Revenue Effect 4/ 110% 16% 17% 
Production Volume Adjustments 26% 13% 11% 8% 12% 5% 
Employment Effect 26% 13% 11% 8% 12% 5% 
1/ Assumes that non-tariff measures are converted to tariff equivalents 
2/ Applies existing tariff and tariff equivalents of NTBs. 
3/ Additional government revenue relative to total value of imports with ad valorem tariff equivalent. 
4/ Total government revenue relative to total value of imports with ad valorem tariff equivalent. 
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already evidence that private investment is being attracted to non-tradable, mainly in services, 
rather than the tradable sectors. Finally, interest groups that have invested in activities that are 
not internationally competitive will resist reforms, creating a lobby against future reforms 
because the value of their invested capital would decline with greater external competition. 
The presence of high escalation in tariffs and tariff equivalents on non-tariff measures also 
discourage the growth of input producing industries. Laos already has a comparative 
advantage in a number of input-producing activities and, when tariff escalation discriminates 
against these activities, entrepreneurs will favor more protected downstream activities that may 
not have comparative advantages. Industrial development among successful developing 
countries has followed a pattern of movement from raw material and intermediate good 
production to the production of final goods, and tariff escalation can undermine efforts of 
countries like Laos to successfully industrialize. 
7. Recommendations 
Guiding Principles - An optimal trade policy regime is predictable, transparent and administered 
in a way that consumers, producers and investors can rely on market signals provided by 
prices that bear some established relationship to the trade regime. As such, tariffs are the best 
known transparent instrument of protection. They provide administrative predictability and 
transparency, and they offer an easy way to accomplish tariff reductions that signals to 
economic agents that the country is on the path to a market-based economy. For those 
reasons, it would be preferable to eliminate existing non-tariff measures that promote 
inefficiencies and rent-seeking and adopt a system based solely on tariffs as the instrument of 
protection. Excise and consumer taxes are consistent with a predictable and transparent 
system since they do not discriminate between foreign and domestic goods. 
Lessons Learned from Other ASEAN Countries – The lessons learned from the other ASEAN 
countries, especially the recent experiences of Cambodia, also an LDC, and Vietnam, are that 
protection can be effectively applied to some industries, especially those that are in infant 
stages of development, and that the most effective instrument for that type of protection is 
provided by tariffs. The reason is that tariff measures are less likely to lead to rent seeking and 
costly administrative practices, and they limit the exercise of possible domestic monopoly 
power. By making tariffs the centerpiece of trade policy, the ASEAN countries have brought 
their economic policies in line with WTO practices in which tariffs are, with very few exceptions, 
the only acceptable tool for protection. These trade policy adjustments have been conditional 
on parallel domestic policy reforms, and together they have provided the means by which those 
ASEAN countries have effectively integrated their economies into the global trading system. 
Transforming Non-Tariff Measures into Tariffs – The Government’s use of non-tariff measures 
in the cement and steel bar industries is based on its desire to promote them both as infant and 
strategic industries. However, those types of measures create inefficiencies, and they lack 
transparency and predictability. In Lao PDR’s accession negotiations it is likely that members 
will stress the need for Laos to abide by WTO’s transparency obligations, as contained in 
GATT Article X. Likewise, the predictability principle can be ensured by providing preferences 
to tariffs over less transparent and less secure non-tariff measures such as quotas and 
licenses. Only regimes based on tariffs can ensure that the variance in protection is kept within 
observable limits.   
Tariffs on Beer – The existing nominal rate of protection (NRP) of 110 percent for the domestic 
brewer industry is considerably higher that the level of protection given to the domestic beer 
industries of other ASEAN countries. On average the tariff rate of other ASEAN countries is 
about 40 percent. Moreover, CEPT-AFTA rates are much lower in other countries, averaging 
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only 11 percent compared with the 40 percent rate of Laos. Nevertheless, Laos is committed to 
reducing its CEPT-AFTA rate on beer to zero percent by 2015. There is therefore considerable 
scope for also reducing the MFN rate to a level that would be more in line with other ASEAN 
countries over the next few years. 
Making the Industry More Competitive following WTO Accession – Lao PDR’s transition to a 
market economy along with its accession to the WTO will place increasing pressures on the 
brewery and construction industries to enhance their competitiveness without having to rely on 
protection and subsidies. While infant industry protective measures can be used to help that 
transition process, the country’s Action Plan submitted to the WTO will necessarily include a 
timeline for the elimination of WTO- inconsistent measures. That timeline increases the 
importance of introducing effective measures to support and facilitate the transition of these 
industries to maturity or enhanced those that already exist. Industry-specific adjustments 
directly affecting the industry’s production costs include: 
 Skills development through sustainable business development services that promote 
the use of advanced technologies and modern management techniques. 
 Expanded use of upstream activities within the country to lower the costs of sourcing 
supplies from neighboring countries. 
 Greater use of networking facilities and clusters to upgrade suppliers and supporting 
services. 
 Continued dissemination of modern production facilities and environmentally friendly 
production technologies. 
 Improvements in transportation and logistics to reduce costs of raw material sourcing 
and distribution to domestic markets. 
 Improved access to credit at competitive rates or soft loans from commercial and 
development banks. 
Equally important are economy-wide reforms that affect the costs of domestic business activity 
and thereby directly impact on the ability of the industries to compete with foreign suppliers, 
especially: 
 Introducing the specific trade reforms enumerated below aimed at reducing market 
distortions while concurrently supporting the industries targeted by the government’s 
industrialization program. 
 Reducing the cost of doing business in the areas identified as having low rankings in 
the country relative to those of neighboring countries that represent important 
competitors for the target industries. 
 Reviewing exchange rate policies affecting the country’s competitiveness with 
neighboring countries, particularly in the light of changes in the management of 
currencies taking place in Asian countries during the rebalancing of the global 
economy. 
Potential Trade Reforms – The contrast between the present trade regime and alternative 
regimes suggests a remaining agenda for reforms.  Such an agenda is not too difficult to 
identify and could include the following elements. 
 Initially convert existing non-tariff measures in cement to an ad valorem tariff equivalent 
of 11 percent and convert those in steel bars to an ad valorem tariff of 12 percent to 
make tariffs the only instrument of protection, increase transparency, enhance 
government revenue and reduce administrative costs in the public sector.  
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 Over time, gradually reduce the overall tariff level on beer to bring it in line with CEPT-
AFTA rates by 2015, as well as competitive trade practices of other countries.  
 Over the next few years, reduce the ad valorem tariff equivalent on cement and steel 
bars from their effective duty rates of 16-17 percent to more competitive MFN rates of 5 
to 10 percent.  
 Reduce nominal tariff dispersion by moving to fewer rates in stages that would lead to a 
multi-tier structure of three to five rates across industries. 
 Gradually reduce tariffs on inputs for the selected industries to zero to improve their 
cost competitiveness and provide greater effective rates of protection.  
 In the interim, allow duty-free access to foreign inputs through the introduction of duty 
drawback and temporary admission systems.  
While these prescriptions for the industries may appear daunting, without them there is a 
strong likelihood that the competitiveness of the industries will be eroded following the 
country’s accession and full implementation of the Action Plan for compliance with WTO rules. 
For the private sector, it means establishing realistic industrialization targets that match the 
country’s human and natural resource development potential; for the government, it means 
more effectively coordinating plans, programs and implementation projects across agencies; 
and for development partners and donors it means improve collaboration among agencies so 
as to ensure complementarity of programs and projects supporting the country’s industrial 
development program.  
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1. Introduction and Coverage of the Study 
1.1 Industry Profiles  
The present study examines the impact of Lao PDR’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) on the country’s cement, steel bars and beer industries. The 
importance of these industries to the economy is significant in terms of output, 
employment and linkages to other downstream and upstream activities. Cement and beer 
each contribute 10 percent to the total value of industrial activity, and steel contributes 
about 3 percent of the total. The three industries together employ 2,400 persons. Within 
the construction industry, cement and steel jointly account for nearly one-third of value 
added, which itself represents a third of total industrial production of the country (Figure 
1.1). The following is a brief description of the industries: 
Cement – The cement industry in Laos was established in the mid-1980s and it now 
produces about 830 thousand metric tons of the country’s 1.4 million tons of annual 
cement utilization. The industry employs about 1200 persons, and contributes about US$ 
70 million a year to the Lao economy in terms of value added. The two main cement plants 
are the Vangvieng I & II Cement Plants and new plants are located in Khammoune and 
Savannakhet provinces. Vangvieng Cement Plant I was established in the district of 
Vangvieng (Vientiane Province) in 1994 with the support of a loan from the Chinese 
government. It produces Cement Portland P-525 and P-425 using domestic coal and 
limestone from Vangvieng and 
gypsum from Savannakhet. 
Vangvieng Cement Plant II was 
established in 1998, and it is jointly 
owned by Lao Agricultural and 
Forestry Development and Service 
company (40% share) and Yunnan 
International Economic-Technical 
Cooperation (60% share). In 2004 Lao 
Agricultural and Forestry 
Development and Service Company 
also entered into a joint venture with 
Construction Material Yunnan 
Company of China build clinker plant 
in Savannakhet with a production 
capacity of 180,000 tons per year to 
supply clinker to cement plants 
located in Khammoune, Savannakhet and Vangvieng. Domestic supplies of one of the two 
principle raw materials, gypsum, is abundant in Laos, but clinker supplies are limited and 
much of it is imported from Thailand and Vietnam.1  
Steel Bars - The steel industry of Laos produces about 24 thousand tons of the country’s 
135 thousand tons of annual utilization of steel bars. Domestic production therefore 
supplies about one-fifth of the country’s total consumption needs. The industry employs 
about 400 persons, and contributes about US$ 27 million a year to the Lao economy in 
                                            
1 For details on the industry, see Sitthiroth Rasphone et al, “Protection of the Lao Cement Industry in the Wake 
of Trade Liberalization”. Vientiane, National Economic Research Institute (NERI), undated. 
Figure 1.1: Share of Cement, Steel Bar and Beer Industries 
in Total Value of Industrial Production of Laos, 2008 
 
Source: Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, and Ministry of Industry and Commerce. 
IMPLICATIONS OF WTO ACCESSION FOR SELECTED DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES OF LAOS    
 
2 
terms of value added. There are over 20 steel factories in the country, the largest of which 
is Vientiane Steel Industry (VSI). Their combined total production capacity is about 
200,000 metric ton a year. Production capacity is therefore over eight times greater than 
existing production, but demand for locally produced steel bars is low. Most of foreign 
imports originate in Thailand and, to a lesser extent, in China and Vietnam. Significant 
differences in the domestic and neighboring steel producing technologies and production 
scales have created large differences in the competitiveness of those industries. Learning 
and absorption of imported technology have been important to the success of the steel 
industry. VSI has benefited from the Lao Clean Production Programme of the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce, funded by UNIDO, as a means of improving steel production 
methods. These and other types of government support have been an important 
contributor to the development of the steel industry throughout Southeast Asia, especially 
since the introduction of integrated steelworks requires large investment. Nonetheless, the 
key factor determining the successful development of the industry in countries has been 
the absorption of technologies and backward linkages into the growth of steel-using 
industries like electronics components and other consumer-oriented industries.2 
Beer – Beer is produced by the Lao Brewery Company and the Asia Pacific Breweries. 
Lao Brewery Company (LBC) was founded in 1971 and soon thereafter it became a state-
owned-enterprise (SOE). In 1993 it entered into a joint venture with two foreign 
companies, and it has recently partnered with Carlsberg Brewery, which holds 50 percent 
of LBC’s shares. The Government holds the remaining shares. Asia Pacific Breweries 
initiated production of Tiger, ABC, Nam Khong beers in Laos in March 2008. It is a joint 
venture with the Government, which holds 25 percent of the shares, as well as a locally-
based partner, SBK Consultant, which holds 7 percent of the shares. Local beer brand 
production is also emerged in Savannakhet. These developments have increased 
competition within the Lao domestic beer market. The brewing sector currently employs 
about 800 persons, and contributes nearly US$ 75 million a year to the Lao economy in 
terms of value added. The indirect impact of the sector on the agricultural and hospitality 
sectors is substantial. The Government receives revenue from a 10 percent turnover tax 
and an excise tax of 50 percent that are imposed on domestic producers and foreign 
supplies of beer alike. In addition, a 40 percent duty rate applies to foreign imports. 
1.2 Lao PDR’s WTO Accession Process 
Lao PDR applied for accession to WTO in 1997 and the practical work towards accession 
began with the Working Party meeting on October 2004. In November 2006 the 
Government submitted to the Working Party an initial offer on goods and the applied tariff 
rates, and in October 2007 it submitted an initial offer on trade in services.3 The exact 
timing of Lao PDR’s accession to WTO depends on the momentum of the accession 
process and the requisite amendments of laws and regulations. Nonetheless, the next 
meeting of the working party in late 2009 or early 2010 will examine elements of a draft 
working party report, which will include Laos’ first possible commitments on implementing 
the WTO agreements.4  
                                            
2 For a comparative analysis of the steel industries among the Southeast Asian countries, see Hajime Sato, 
“The Iron and Steel Industry in Asia: Development and Reconstruction”. Institute of Developing Economies, 
Discussion Paper No. 210, August 2009.  
3 World Trade Organization document WT/ACC/SPEC/LAO/3 (restricted), October 2007. 
4 WTO Secretariat, “Laos turns to future WTO membership commitments”. WTO: 2009 News Items. 14 July  
2009. Available: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/acc_lao_14jul09_e.htm. 
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In negotiating its accession, Laos will be limited in its capacity to promote and protect 
domestic industries. A key guiding principle of WTO is that protection of domestic industry 
should be limited to tariff measures and that non-tariff barriers like quantitative and 
qualitative controls be eliminated or converted to tariffs. These requirements are, 
nonetheless, subject to exceptions related to balance of payments difficulties, safeguards 
and other rules, or for the protection of public health or national security (GATT Articles 
XII, XVIII, XIX, XX and XXI). As a least-developed country (LDC), Lao PDR’s application 
for membership in the WTO is covered by the 2002 General Council guidelines for 
accelerating membership negotiations.5 Under those guidelines WTO Members are to 
exercise restraint in seeking concessions and commitments on trade in goods and 
services from acceding LDCs. Moreover, transitional periods and arrangements are 
provided under specific WTO Agreements to enable acceding LDCs to effectively 
implement commitments and obligations. These transitional provisions are to be granted in 
accession negotiations, taking into account individual development, financial and trade 
needs of Laos. Transitional periods and arrangements are to be accompanied by Action 
Plans for compliance with WTO rules, with the ultimate elimination of those transitional 
arrangements within a specified period of time. 
In its transition to a market economy, Laos confronts mixed challenges in promoting its 
local industries while concurrently fulfilling its obligations under the WTO. As such, the 
Government will need to put in place proper mechanism and measures that are in 
compliant with WTO rules and concurrently institute various initiatives that support the 
Sixth National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2006-2010). Existing protection of 
certain industries like those of beer, cement and steel bars could affect the speed of the 
WTO accession negotiations. As such, the present study examines the implications of WTO 
accessions on the selected domestic industries of cement, steel bar and brewery 
with a view to developing recommendations on how to concurrently manage the 
Government’s domestic strategic objectives with its effective involvement in 
global economy.  
1.3 Coverage and Organization of the Study 
The overall objectives of this study are (a) to provide a clear understanding on WTO 
agreements and disciplines related to the promotion and protection of the domestic 
industry for the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MOIC), which is the agency to lead 
the WTO accession negotiations; (b) to raise awareness among policy makers and 
industry players of proper measures for the promotion and protection of domestic 
producers, in particular the construction materials and beverage industries; and (c) to 
contribute to an improvement in the legal and regulatory framework, and the administrative 
capacities to ensure compliance with WTO requirements. The study aims to (i) assess the 
cement, steel bars and beer industries; (ii) provide a detailed description of trade and 
industrial policies in each subsector; (iii) assess import duties and non-tariff barriers; (iv) 
assess the impacts of accession to WTO on these sectors and policy-making; and (v) 
make recommendations on tariff reduction strategies and alternative protection measures. 
The study covers the following areas: (a) an overall assessment of cement, steel bars and 
beer industries, including their structure, competitiveness, potential growth, and 
contribution to the national economy; (b) a description of trade and industrial policies in 
                                            
5 World Trade Organization, “Accession of Least-Developed Countries”. Document WT/L/508, 20 January 
2003. 
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each subsector; (c) an assessment of import duties and non-tariff barriers, including 
currently applied Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs, CEPT-AFTA rates, and NTBs in the 
form of import licensing, discriminatory taxes and other relevant measures; and (d) an 
assessment of the impacts of accession to WTO on these sectors and policy-making, 
including an examination of existing Lao PDR laws and regulations relevant to the 
requirements of the WTO and their WTO-consistency. Recommendations are provided on 
tariff reduction strategies and alternative protection measures that could be adopted by the 
Government of Lao PDR in the context of its WTO accession process. These 
recommendations take into account special and differential treatment provisions accorded 
to the country under its LDC status. 
It should be noted that the present study is designed to supplement rather that duplicate 
earlier industry studies. Following the initial fieldwork of the study and during the meeting 
on preliminary findings, MOIC indicated its desire that the study avoid duplication of earlier 
works and instead focus on an assessment of the WTO impact on the selected industries. 
Reference is made throughout the study to those other studies. Nonetheless, special 
reference is here made to a recent NERI study on cement, which provides comprehensive 
information on the structure and operation of that industry in Laos.6 The interested reader 
is referred to that study for details about the structure and operation of the industry. 
The study is organized as follows: 
 Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the study, an overview of the industries covered, Lao 
PDR’s ongoing WTO accession process, and the coverage and organization of the study; 
 Chapter 2 reviews trade and industrial policies as they relate to the selected industries, 
especially the WTO-consistency of laws and regulations; 
 Chapter 3 assesses the factors determining the competitiveness of the selected industries 
in the context of foreign competition, and the growth potential of those industries; 
 Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive analysis of tariff and non-tariff measures in the 
industries, the effective rates of protection, and the total protection given to the industries 
in terms of the ad valorem tariff equivalents of non-tariff measures; 
 Chapter 5 examines the impact of WTO accession on the industries in terms of output, 
employment, imports, government revenue and effective rates of protection under 
alternative trade policy regimes; and 
 Chapter 6 discusses the arguments for protection and liberalization of the industries, and 
the conversion of non-tariff measures to ad valorem tariffs; it then summarizes the results 
of the study and concludes with some policy and institutional recommendations. 
 Annex A shows how to derive ad valorem tariff equivalents of existing non-tariff measures 
in the industries, as well as their effective rates of assistance.  
 Annex B offers a practitioners guide to calculating effective rates of protection in the 
industries. 
 Annex C presents trade statistics of the industries. 
 Annex D lists the persons interviewed during the course of the study. 
 Annex E provides a list of references used in the study. 
                                            
6 Sitthiroth Rasphone et al, “Protection of the Lao Cement Industry in the Wake of Trade Liberalization”. 
Vientiane, National Economic Research Institute (NERI), undated. 
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2. Trade and Industrial Policies 
 
2.1 National Trade and Industrial Policies 
The Government has identified key priority industries to be promoted under its Strategy on 
Industrialization and Modernization (2001-2020). They include the construction materials 
industry of cement and steel bars. The strategy is based on, first, human resource 
development to boost the country’s industrialization process and, second, investment in 
research and development (R&D). It also encourages inward FDI flow and the 
development of local capacity to absorb the technological transfer. The construction sector 
is also mentioned explicitly as a strategic sector for the country’s development in the 
National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP) for 2006-2010.7 Under the NSEDP, 
the Government is promoting the private sector and encouraging foreign companies to 
invest more capital in developing the target industries. In support of those initiatives, it is 
implementing development policies for industries that rely on domestic materials as a 
means of increasing their value-added and ensuring the broadest impact on economic 
development. As such, much of the development of cement and steel production is 
oriented towards expanding upstream activities in each of the industries.  
Lao PDR’s negotiations for WTO membership involve mutual agreement on adjustments 
needed to bring the trade regime in line with the way that member countries regulate 
trade, and agreeing to the rules of accession that conform with the Government’s 
development goals. Thus, while WTO consistency is important, equally important is the 
Government’s development strategy for the construction materials and brewery industries 
that is based on the broader needs of the country and its people. As such, the 
Government has established a set of guidelines for the industries in a manner that is 
consistent with the NSEDP 2006-2010. In particular, the guidelines seek to improve the 
competitive position of those infant industries by providing temporary protection to 
domestic producers in order to provide them with time to adopt new technologies, lower 
production costs, and realize economies of scale. During the transition to fully-competitive 
industries, it is expected that firms will take advantage of the protection given to them to 
increasingly link their production with external sources of technology, leverage the 
expertise and capacities of those sources and learn to use and adapt them to their 
production processes as a means of enhancing competitiveness.8  
At the same time, the Government is aware of the need to foster private sector initiative, 
and recent plans have highlighted the importance of improving opportunities for the private 
sector, especially by reducing barriers to doing business. As such, Lao PDR’s industrial 
development plans have sought to promote these domestic industries in a way that allows 
them to compete with foreign supplies.9 Specific initiatives include, for example, the 
application of a quality management system for ISO certifications, which have already 
                                            
7 See UNIDO, “Lao PDR: Medium-Term Strategy and Action Plan for Effective Industrial Development”. 
UNIDO Integrated Programme for Lao PDR, May 2003. 
8 See UNDP, “National Human Development Report: International Trade and Human Development”. Lao PDR 
2006.  
9 See UNIDO, “A Comprehensive Framework to Forster Economic Initiative in LAO PDR; Lao PDR: Medium-
term Strategy and Action Plan for Industrial Development, UNIDO Integrated Programme for LAO PDR: 
Vientiane, 2003. 
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been granted to companies within the brewery, cement and steel bar industries. This 
certification allows these companies to better compete with foreign firms, particularly those 
under current government and donor procurement procedures.  
In its trade strategy, Lao PDR has embarked on major reforms leading to a gradual 
liberalization of external trade that accelerated after the country’s accession to ASEAN 
in 1997. As a member of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), it began implementation 
of the AFTA Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme in 1998, and in 
January 2008 it completed a major milestone in the liberalization schedule by reducing 
import duties on 95 percent of products from ASEAN countries to between 0 and 5 
percent.10 Beer is subject to a CEPT rate of 40 percent until 2013, 20 percent in 2014, 
and zero thereafter. Cement is subject to a 5 percent rate until 2014 and zero 
thereafter. Steel bars has a CEPT rate of zero (0) percent effective 2008.11 The Lao 
Brewery Company, which is the major producer of beer in Lao, will benefit from the 
reduction of barriers among AFTA countries. With the duty rate reduction in Thailand 
from 60 percent MFN rate to 5 percent until 2011 and zero thereafter, Lao Brewery 
expect to substantially increase its shipments to that market.12 
Lao PDR and the United States signed a Bilateral Trade Agreement in 1997 and 
Normal Trade Relations was granted in February 2005. It is the most comprehensive 
agreement that Lao PDR has signed to date since it involves deep commitments that 
mirror key areas under the WTO agreements. Despite that fact that the United States 
is the second largest source of foreign investment in the Lao PDR, trade between the 
two countries remained limited until normal trade relations (NTR) were established in 
November 2004.13 Thereafter, Lao exporters gained direct access to the US market, 
rather than being restricted by prohibitive US tariffs. In the short-run, the country’s 
industries that stand to benefit the most from increased market access are the garment 
and handicraft sub-sectors. Lao PDR has been exporting beer to the US market since 
1999. Its export level to that market reached a high of nearly US$ 170 thousand in 
2000 and was almost US$ $50 thousand in 2008. Lao Brewery Company has 
continued to explore the market and expects to further penetrate the market in the 
future.14 The country is also engaging in free trade area (FTA) negotiations with 
ASEAN-dialogues partners, namely, China, the Republic of Korea, Japan, India, and 
                                            
10 For an analysis of the effects of AFTA on Lao PDR, see Phouphet Kyophilavong, “Analyzing the effect of 
AFTA on Lao economy: Macroeconomic model approach”. National University of Laos, Faculty of Economic 
and Management. Paper prepared for the ESRI Asia Workshop on Economic Modeling on Deepening 
Interrelationships among Asian Countries, held on November 30, 2004 in Bangkok, Thailand.  
11 Steel bars are classified under as Harmonized System (HS) items 7213  (Bars & rods, iron & na steel, h-r 
irregular coils); 7214 (Bars & rods, iron & na steel not elsewhere classified); 7215 (Bars & rods, iron & na steel 
not elsewhere classified); 7221 (Bars and rods, stainless steel, hot-rolled, irregular coils); 7222 Bars & rods, 
straight steel not elsewhere classified, angles, straight steel); 7227 (Bars & rods alloy steel not elsewhere 
classified, hot-rolled irregular coils); and 7228 (Alloy steel not elsewhere classified bars). 
12 The duty rate in Thailand was initially established at 5 percent until 2009 and zero thereafter. However, the 
duty rate was subsequently extended to 2011 (see Digital Journal, 20 September 2007, available: 
http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/230699/Beer_Lao_delays_export_plans.  
13 P.J. Gunawardana and S. Sisombat, “Trends and Patterns of Foreign Direct Investment in Lao PDR”. 
School of Applied Economics and Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, and Victoria Graduate School of 
Business, Victoria University, January 2008. The data used in the report is from the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment of the Government of Lao PDR. 
14 Fund for Reconciliation and Development, “Summary of the US-Lao NTR Study Tour”. Available: 
http://www.ffrd.org/LaoTrade/NTRSummary.htm.  
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Australia and New Zealand. Lao PDR also 
benefits from the Asia Pacific Trade 
Agreement (APTA), which seeks to deepen 
trade cooperation and integration among 
developing countries in areas beyond 
traditional tariff concessions to cover non-
tariff measures, trade facilitation, trade in 
services and investment.15  
Lao PDR is eligible to benefit from the 
European Union’s generalized system of 
preferences (GSP) called ‘Everything but 
Arms’ (EBA) initiative. It extends duty and 
quota-free access to all products except 
armaments originating in least developed 
countries. EBA provides the most favorable 
regime available since it grants duty free 
access to Lao PDR and other least developed 
countries to the EU market if they meet the 
rules of origin requirements. About 70 percent 
of Lao PDR exports to the EU market 
currently receive preferential treatment, which 
includes beer. Exports of beer from Laos to 
Europe reached nearly $50,000, which 
represented one-fifth of the country’s total 
exports of the product.16 Beer is subject to 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
requirements imposed by the EU market. 
2.2 WTO Compliance of Legal and Regulatory Environment 
Regional and bilateral processes have supported the multilateral liberalization process 
that is currently underway. While the pace of trade liberalization in Laos has been 
established by AFTA, the country’s membership in the WTO will require a number of 
additional disciplines on trade-related policies.17 During the last year the Government has 
made the following modifications to the trade regime as it affects the selected industries 
                                            
15 Previously named the Bangkok Agreement, APTA is as an initiative of UNESCAP that aims to promote intra-
regional trade among developing countries through the exchange of mutually agreed concessions. 
16 Data from the United Nations COMTRADE database. Available: http://comtrade.un.org/. 
17 Partly in compliance with the need to bring laws into international standards as part of the WTO accession 
process, the National Assembly is developing or amending the following trade and investment-related laws in 
the next two-to-three years:  
o In 2008, law on handicraft; law on mass media; veterinary law; law on tariff nomenclature; law on 
management of public investment projects; law on consumer protection; law on mining; law on promotion 
of domestic investment; law on contracts; 
o In 2009, law on agents and brokers; law on transfer of assets to capital; law on construction; 
o In 2010, law on professional associations; law on implementation of international treaties; law on printing; 
law on measurement standards; law on processing industry. 
Figure 2.1: Domestic versus Import Prices 
 
 
Sources: Internal Trade Department, Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce, and COMTRADE database. 
Cement import prices refer to Portland cement 
(HS2523) and steel rod prices refer to Bars & rods, 
iron & na steel (HS 7214). 
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covered by this study:18 (a) Under TRIMS, the previous incentive laws have been replaced 
by a new Investment Law passed by the National Assembly that eliminates the local 
content related investment incentives as well as discriminatory provisions found in the 
previous Domestic and Foreign Investment Promotion Laws; (b) for import-export 
procedures, a Decree on Import Licensing Procedures has been adopted that incorporates 
the requirements of the Import Licensing Agreement; (c) in line with the requirements of 
GATT Article VIII Cost-based importation charges, a Presidential Decree on Fees and 
Service Charges has been amended under which the previous ad valorem inspection fee 
for imported food has been replaced by a cost-based fee; (d) in customs valuation, a 
regulation was adopted to give effect to the 2006 Customs Law and its implementing 
Decree; (e) in TBT/SPS, the National Food Safety Policy and Regulation on Food Safety 
Management were adopted; and (f) in the area of tax reform, the VAT Law was passed 
and will enter into force on 1 January 2010. Beyond these modifications, the following are 
the relevant WTO requirements for Lao PDR’s legal and regulatory regime affecting the 
brewery and constructions sectors examined in this study. 
Investment Measures – Members of the WTO accession working party have noted Lao 
PDR’s export performance and local content requirements, as well as provisions in Law 
No. 11/NA requiring foreign-invested companies to hire at least 90 percent of the work 
force locally (Article 12.5) and obliging them to train, upgrade professional skills, and 
transfer technology to the local employees (Article 13). While recognizing the importance 
of technology transfer, some members of the working party have not consider mandatory 
provisions on technology transfer helpful for the investment climate; the 90 percent local 
workforce requirement was discriminatory as well as unhelpful; and incentives linked to 
minimum 50 percent local raw material were incompatible with the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM). 
Pricing Policies – Prime Minister's Decree No. 207/PM of 11 October 2001 authorized the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce to monitor prices or institute price controls. Based on 
the Prime Minister's Decree, the Ministry had issued Instruction No. 0334/MOC/ITD of 22 
March 2002, making some 30 products/product groups subject to price controls, including 
maximum prices on cement and steel bars. Imported cement and steel are, however, not 
subject to price controls. The differential is shown in Figure 2.1. The import price is the 
c.i.f. price, while the domestic price is the maximum price set by the Government and 
calculated on the basis of production costs provided by the cement and steel plants. It 
includes both the production and distribution costs to the main markets. Licensing and 
other controls over imports allow the domestic price to exceed that of foreign suppliers. 
While the price differential is fairly stable, sharp market price variations are not always 
captured by government authorities in their domestic price adjustment. This situation 
occurred recently in the case of steel rods, when the market price surge up at the 
beginning of 2008 was followed by an abrupt fall in prices in July and August of that year. 
However, domestic prices continued to rise and did not adjust downward until November 
2008.   
Tariffs and Other Taxes – Lao PDR had applied the ASEAN Harmonized Tariff 
Nomenclature (AHTN) since 1 October 2003. The nomenclature is based on the 2002 
version of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS). All MFN 
                                            
18 WTO Secretariat, “Laos turns to future WTO membership commitments”. WTO: 2009 News Items. 14 July  
2009. Available: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/acc_lao_14jul09_e.htm. 
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customs duties are ad valorem, applied on the c.i.f value of the imported goods. There are 
no tariff rate quotas on any products. Excise duties range from 5 to 90 percent, and a 50 
percent rate is applied to alcoholic beverages. That tax rates does not distinguish between 
imported and domestically produced goods. A turnover tax based on Tax Law No. 04/NA 
of 19 February 2005 constitutes a general indirect tax on the consumption of goods and 
services, levied at a rate of 5 or 10 per cent, which is collected on imports at customs 
checkpoints and from wholesalers.19 A value added tax (VAT) will replace the turnover tax, 
probably in 2010.  
Quantitative Import Restrictions – Steel and cement are subject to import licensing. Prime 
Minister's Decree No. 205/PMO "On Export and Import" of 11 October 2001 constituted 
the basis for Lao PDR's present import and export controls, and the Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce issued Notifications to specify the goods subject to approval or non-
automatic or automatic import licensing. The procedure for imported steel bars and 
cement are stipulated in Regulation No. 1036/STEA-PMO. In practice, permits for 
importing cement and steel are formally approved by Government authorities only when 
the domestic industries are unable to fulfill the demand from local producers destined for 
the construction of development projects. Under the WTO, however, Article 2.2(b) of the 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures authorized automatic import licensing to be 
maintained "as long as the circumstances which gave rise to its introduction prevail and as 
long as its underlying administrative purposes cannot be achieved in a more appropriate 
way". For that reason, the licensing regime of Lao PDR continues to be under review to 
adapt to WTO requirements regarding automatic and non-automatic licensing procedures.  
Anti-Dumping, Countervailing Duties and Safeguard Regimes - Lao PDR has no 
legislation authorizing the application of anti-dumping, countervailing, or safeguard 
measures at present, but the Government has not exclude the possibility that such 
legislation could be implemented in the future. In any event, the Government has 
confirmed that it would not apply any anti-dumping, countervailing or safeguard measures 
until it had notified and implemented appropriate laws in conformity with the provisions of 
the WTO Agreements on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994, on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures, and on Safeguards.20  
Export Subsidies - Lao PDR has reserved its rights to special and differential treatment as 
an LDC under Article 27: Annex VII of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (ASCM), and it may have included incentives contingent on export performance 
within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the ASCM in its Law No. 10/NA "On the Promotion 
of Domestic Investment" (Articles 9 and 11); Law No. 11/NA "On the Promotion of Foreign 
Investment" (Articles 16 and 18); and in Decree No. 301/PM of the Prime Minister 
"Regarding the Implementation of the Law on the Promotion of Foreign Investment" 
(Article 15 and Annex 2). As Article 25 of the ASCM obliges WTO Members to notify all 
subsidies, including prohibited subsidies contingent upon export or the use of domestic 
over imported goods, Lao PDR has requested technical assistance from international 
partners to fulfill the notification requirement under Article 25 of the ASCM. As an LDC, 
                                            
19 According to Article 14 of the Tax Law, the taxable base for turnover tax on imported goods includes import 
duty and, where applicable, the excise tax. Domestically-produced goods destined for the internal market are 
taxed on the basis of the actual sales price, the actual value of the contract for goods produced under 
contractual arrangements, the total services income for services providers, and the actual price paid by the 
customers for sales on credit. 
20 WTO Secretariat, “Accession of the Lao PDR to the World Trade Organization: Factual Summary of Points 
Raised”. JOB(07)/160. 26 October 2007.  
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Laos is exempted from the prohibition of export subsidies, but not from the prohibition of 
local content subsides, so all local content subsidies need to be eliminated by the date of 
accession. 
Technical Barriers to Trade, Standards and Certification – Decree of the Prime Minister 
No. 85/PM "On Management of Standards and Quality of Products and Goods" of 2 
November 1995 constituted the basic legal framework for Lao PDR's present system of 
standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment. Amongst the relevant 
regulations in this area he pointed to the Regulation No. 1036/STEA-PMO "On Quality 
Inspection of Imported Goods" of 11 June 2002; Regulation No. 08/MOH of 4 January 
2005 (e.g. food additives such as acetic acid and caffeine being subject to surveillance); 
and the Regulation "On the Control on Production, Export-Imported Safe Food" No. 
586/MOH of 12 May 2006. Products subject to mandatory technical regulations were 
included in the notifications of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce concerning 
prohibited and controlled goods for importation and exportation, the most recent being the 
notification on Goods Subject to a Non Automatic Licensing of Laos, number 2151/STEA-
PMO. For import management control, there is the Decree on Import Licensing Procedure 
on 180/PMO on 7 July 2009. A new Standards Law supplemented by implementing 
decrees and regulations establishes a TBT enquiry point testing facilities for construction 
materials and other products will be in place by 2011. Full implementation of the TBT 
Agreement is expected by 2012. 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures – Lao PDR is a member of the WHO Codex 
Alimentarius Commission21, the International Office of Epizootics22, and the International 
Plant Protection Convention23. But implementation of many measures has not been 
carried out due to lack of technology, tools, financing, human resources, and staff 
capabilities. At the regional level, harmonization of SPS measures are treated under 
ASEAN,24 and the it also participates in regional harmonization of, and alignment of SPS 
measures, technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures on 
technical barriers to trade in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS).25 In the brewery 
industry, SPS standards for the beverage industry are monitored by for food safety the 
Ministry of Public Health’s Department of Food and Drug and the Department of Hygiene 
and Disease Prevention. Lao PDR needs to improve its risk assessment procedures, 
upgrade the existing legislation, and improve and develop its SPS-related processes and 
                                            
21 The Codex Alimentarius Commission was created in 1963 by FAO and WHO to develop food standards, 
guidelines and related texts such as codes of practice under the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program. 
The objectives of the program are protecting health of the consumers and ensuring fair trade practices in the 
food trade, and promoting coordination of all food standards work undertaken by international governmental 
and non-governmental organizations. 
22 Office International des Epizooties (OIE) is an intergovernmental organization responsible for improving 
animal health worldwide, under a 1924 agreement to create the organization.  
23 The International Plant Protection Convention is an international treaty to secure action to prevent the 
spread and introduction of pests of plants and plant products, and to promote appropriate measures for their 
control. It is governed by the Commission on Phytosanitary Measures (CPM) which adopts International 
Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPMs). The CPM has confirmed the IPP as the preferred forum for 
national IPPC reporting and the exchange of more general information among the phytosanitary community. 
The IPPC Secretariat coordinates the activities of the Convention and is provided by the FAO. 
24 Expert Working Group on Harmonization of Phytosanitary Measures in ASEAN. 
25 Under the GMS Trade Facilitation Working Group (TFWG) of the GMS. 
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infrastructure.26 The principles of the SPS Agreement regarding science-based 
regulations, measures based on necessity, equivalence, nondiscrimination, and control, 
inspection and approval procedures have yet to be incorporated in domestic regulations. 
Laos is currently implementing regulation for the Food Law, and promulgating decrees or 
regulations on food controls. Lao PDR expects to be in full compliance with the SPS 
Agreement by 2012.  
                                            
26 The Government submitted an Action Plan for implementation of SPS measures to the WTO Secretariat in 
May 2006. It contains the timeline for completion of specific actions needed for Lao PDR to be fully compliant 
with the SPS Agreement. Among the key actions are (a) approval of new Veterinarian Law by 2009 and 
grassroots enforcement by 2009-20011; (b) strengthen laboratory and quarantine facilities by 2010; (c) 
promulgate training courses for technicians and specialists and establish a Veterinary Faculty in National 
University by 2010; (d) provide technical training programs for risk assessment systems, upgrade equipment 
for inspection, sampling, diagnosis and treatments, and implement risk analysis for the control of animals and 
animal products by 2010; (e) disease free areas and areas of low prevalence of animal infectious disease by 
2010; (f) and, for food and drugs, establish the necessary control, inspection and approval procedures by 
2010. All of these actions are contingent on financial support and successful implementation of technical 
assistance. 
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3. Competitiveness and Growth Potential 
 
3.1 Factors Impacting on Competitiveness 
Laos has a relatively low international competitiveness ranking in terms of both its macro 
and micro-economic indicators affecting trade and investment in the beer, cement and 
steel bar industries. Its low international 
ranking pervades three broad categories: (a) a 
policy regime that imposes considerable 
barriers to trade and investment, (b) relatively 
high costs of doing business, and (c) an 
exchange rate policies that effectively raises 
domestic costs relative to those of foreign 
sourced products.27  
For the trade regime, the previous chapter has 
enumerated the changes that Laos in 
undertaking to bring its legal and regulatory 
system within international standards that are 
compliant with the WTO. Institutional changes 
require an effective implementation system, 
however, and that of Lao PDR is rated as low relative to most other ASEAN countries 
(Table 3.1). In the context of the World Bank’s governance indicators, effectiveness is a 
measure of capacity of governments to manage resources efficiently, and to formulate, 
implement, and enforce sound policies and regulations. Although low, Lao PDR’s current 
percentile ranking is twice as high as it was in earlier years.  
                                            
27 The World Bank also categorizes competitiveness into (a) overall performance, (b) macroeconomic and 
market dynamism, (c) financial dynamism, (d) infrastructure and investment climate, and (e) human resources. 
Another approach is based on Michael Porter’s determinants of competitiveness and the so-called 
Competitiveness Diamond. The model provides a framework for organizing the determinants of a country’s 
competitiveness and economic growth potential and can be used to assess industry cluster competitiveness 
and to develop strategies for improving competitiveness. The approach is structured around (a) factor (input) 
conditions related to skilled labor, and infrastructure; (b) demand conditions related to size and type of 
accessible demand; (c) supporting industries and presence of supplier; and the context for firm strategy and 
rivalry.  
Table3.2: Lao PDR's Doing Business Ranking 
 
Overall 
Rank 
Starting 
Business 
Construction 
Permits 
Employing 
Workers 
Registering 
Property 
Getting 
Credit 
Protecting 
Investors 
Paying 
Taxes 
Foreign 
Trading 
Enforcing 
Contracts 
 
 
 
Lao PDR 167 89 115 107 161 150 182 113 168 111  
Brunei 96 153 75 4 183 113 119 22 48 160  
Cambodia 145 173 145 134 116 87 73 58 127 141  
China 89 151 180 140 32 61 93 130 44 18  
Indonesia 122 161 61 149 95 113 41 126 45 146  
Malaysia 23 88 109 61 86 1 4 24 35 59  
Philippines 144 162 111 115 102 127 132 135 68 118  
Singapore 1 4 2 1 16 4 2 5 1 13  
Thailand 12 55 13 52 6 71 12 88 12 24  
Vietnam 93 116 69 103 40 30 172 147 74 32  
Source: International Finance Corporation (IFC), Doing Business database. Available: www.doingbusiness.org. 
Table 3.1: Comparative Government 
Effectiveness among ASEAN Countries in 2008 
 
Percentile 
Rank (0-100) 
Governance 
Score (-2.5 to +2.5) 
Myanmar 1.9 -1.68 
Laos 17.5 -0.84 
Cambodia 19.4 -0.81 
Vietnam 45.5 -0.31 
Indonesia 47.4 -0.29 
Philippines 55.0 0.00 
Thailand 58.8 0.11 
Brunei 79.6 0.89 
Malaysia 83.9 1.13 
Singapore 100.0 2.53 
Source: World Bank, "Governance Matters: 
Worldwide Governance Indicators". Available: 
info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/. 
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For business practices, Table 3.2 shows the details of Lao PDR’s ranking of ease of doing 
business. Laos ranks in the top one-third of ASEAN members and China in terms of ease 
of starting a business, and around the mid-point of all country rankings in ease of 
employing workers, paying taxes, and enforcing contracts. But it ranks in the bottom 
quartile in terms of obtaining construction permits, registering property, getting credit, 
protecting investors, trading across borders, and closing a business. The difficulty of 
accessing capital has been underscored in the Milken Institute’s capital access ranking of 
Laos in the bottom 20 countries throughout the world, which is attributable to the lack of 
institutions needed to support and enhance 
business financing activities, access to 
financing institutions within the country, 
access to venture capital, and access to 
foreign capital.28 
In its macroeconomic environment, Lao 
PDR’s real effective exchange rate has given 
rise to a situation that undermined the 
domestic competitiveness of the beer, 
cement and steel bar industries. The real 
effective exchange rate is the weighted 
average (geometric mean) of the kip’s 
exchange rates against other major 
currencies, using the annual value of Lao 
PDR’s trade with the respective countries as 
its weights. When converted to an index 
using a base period, the resulting "nominal 
effective exchange rate" measures the trade-
weighted average of the kip’s cross-rates with 
Lao PDR’s trading partners. The international 
competitiveness of Laos is therefore reflected 
in the ‘real effective exchange rate’ (denoted 
REER), which takes into account both general price movements in Laos relative to that of 
each of its trading partners, and the cross exchange rate between the kip and the currency 
of each of its trading partners.  
Table 3.3 shows the real effective exchange rates for Laos with the major competing 
countries in its domestic markets for beer, cement and steel bars. The year 2001 is used 
as a base year since the REER in that year with an overall balance in the country’s 
balance of payments. The real cross-rates with all competing countries in the domestic 
markets for beer, cement and steel bars has risen, representing an improvement in the 
international competitiveness of the non-tradables sector. The way that the relative price of 
tradables to non-tradables is measured for Laos is based on the so-called Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) approach.29 To the extent that consumers are responsive to relative 
                                            
28 Based on data from the Milken Institute. Available www.milkeninstitute.org. 
29 The PPP exchange rate measure of REER is defined as ert  =  en Pft/Pnt, where en is the nominal exchange 
rate, Pf is the foreign currency price of goods purchased abroad, and Pn is the domestic price level. The 
foreign currency price is measured by the GDP deflator of Lao PDR’s trading partners and the REER is a 
trade-weighted average of those trading partners. A fall in er represents an appreciation in a flexible exchange 
rate system, which under the purchasing power definition can be brought about by either a fall in the nominal 
exchange rate en, or a rise in the relative price of domestic goods (equivalent to a relative fall in the price of 
foreign goods). Conversely, a rise in er represents a depreciation, which is associated with either a rise in the 
Table 3.3: Lao PDR Real Cross-Rates and Real 
Effective Exchange Rate (REER) with Competing 
Suppliers of Selected Industry Products 
  REER 
Real Cross-Rates 
China Thailand Vietnam 
1990  104.4   107.7   82.3   218.8  
1991  98.8   128.1   88.7   224.0  
1992  108.8   133.1   90.5   202.1  
1993  109.3   127.3   94.1   176.1  
1994  113.9   168.2   94.3   164.7  
1995  111.1   154.5   95.2   152.4  
1996  107.6   142.2   91.8   138.2  
1997  97.1   122.7   95.2   119.7  
1998  83.7   88.3   81.3   88.4  
1999  86.6   96.6   81.7   92.6  
2000  98.5   106.7   96.3   102.5  
2001  100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
2002  95.4   97.9   94.4   98.3  
2003  90.4   94.7   89.1   92.9  
2004  103.6   108.4   102.3   106.6  
2005  105.0   110.2   104.2   105.7  
2006  107.2   116.0   105.3   111.4  
2007  104.1   112.5   101.4   113.2  
2008  109.6   112.5   107.2   123.1  
Note: REER denotes real effective exchange rate. 
Source: Derived from data in International Monetary 
     
IMPLICATIONS OF WTO ACCESSION FOR SELECTED DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES OF LAOS    
 
14 
price differences between Laotian and foreign suppliers in the domestic markets for the 
products of the selected industries, the demand for domestically produced goods would 
have weakened in recent years. The results suggest that exchange rate policies have 
somewhat undermined domestic producers beer, cement and steel bars, and that demand 
for those domestically produced goods has not benefitted from those policies. 
3.2 Growth Potential of the Industries 
Lao PDR’s growth potential for steel bars and cement is likely to be limited to its domestic 
market in the medium to long term, while beer has a larger potential for exports. The 
reason for limiting the markets for cement and steel bars to the domestic ones is that Laos 
faces still competition from neighboring countries and transportation costs for a landlocked 
country like Laos limit the potential for long-distance shipments to foreign markets. In 
contrast, beer exports have the potential for dynamic growth within Asia and in the 
European and United States markets. Indeed, beer exports from Laos have quadrupled so 
far this decade, albeit from a low initial level. The forecast is for an annual expansion of 7 
percent in foreign sales over the medium term.30  
For the domestic market, Table 3.4 shows the potential for production expansion based on 
industry standards in each sector.  
                                                                                                                                    
nominal exchange rate en or a rise in relative prices of foreign goods (equivalent to a fall in relative prices of 
domestic goods). The inverse of the real exchange rate therefore measures export competitiveness, since 
variations in er influence the quantity of goods demanded in the foreign markets relative to competing foreign 
and domestic suppliers to those markets. 
30 Lao Brewery Company Limited, presentation on 2 October 2009. 
Table 3.4: Growth Potential of Industries in Domestic Market 
  
Unit for 
Beer 
Units for 
cement & 
steel Beer Cement Steel Bars 
Per Capita 
Consumption 
Current L/yr MT/yr 22.9 0.23 0.02 
Potential L/yr MT/yr 49.6 0.45 0.14 
Total 
Consumption 
Current Mil. L 1000 MT 137.4 1,409.01 134.30 
Potential Mil. L 1000 MT 297.4 2,700.17 840.05 
Domestic 
Production 
Current Mil. L 1000 MT 136.3 831.20 23.9 
Potential Mil. L 1000 MT 294.8 2,700.17 840.05 
Note: L denotes liters; MT denotes metric tons. 
Sources: 
• Population from Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Investment. 
• Beer per capita beer consumption potential based on data from Kirin Holdings Company (available: 
http://www.kirinholdings.co.jp/english/ir/news_release051215_4.html). 
• Beer, cement and steel bar production (actual) from Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and 
Investment. 
• Beer consumption (actual) equals sum of domestic production and imports, based on COMTRADE 
database. 
• Beer consumption (potential) equals beer per capita potential times population. 
• Beer production (potential) assumes that current small proportion of imports will be maintained. 
• Cement and steel bar production potential assumes self-sufficiency in the economy. 
• Cement per capita consumption potential based on world average of 245 kg per person, compared 
with 425 average for China and Thailand, according to IBEF, "Cement", 2009. 
• Steel per capita consumption potential based on world average, according to International Iron and 
Steel Institute, “World Steel in Figures” (Washington, DC, 2006). 
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 In beer, per capita consumption is currently equal to nearly 23 liters a year, whereas 
the average for the lower quartile of countries that consume alcoholic beverages is 
close to 50 liters a year. Assuming that imports retain their existing share in the future, 
the industry could double its existing production level.  
 In cement, per capita consumption is presently 230 kgs per person a year, whereas 
neighboring Thailand and China have comparable levels of 425 kgs per person a year. 
At those levels, Lao consumption would expand by 90 percent over its present level 
and, if the economy were to become self-sufficient in that sector, production could 
expand by treble its current levels.  
 In steel, per capita consumption is only 20 kgs per person a year, compared with a 
world average of 140 kgs. Total consumption has the potential to grow by six times its 
current level, and domestic production only accounts for less than one-fifth of existing 
utilization in the economy. The potential for the industry is therefore considerable, were 
it to become competitive and capable of substituting foreign imports. 
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Table 4.1: Comparative MFN Tariffs on Products of 
Selected Industries among ASEAN Member Countries 
 
Beer 
(HS2203) 
Cement 
(HS2523) 
Steel Bars 
(HS7213) 
WTO 
Member? 
Brunei $3/liter 0% 0% Yes (1995) 
Cambodia 35% 15% 7% Yes (2004) 
Indonesia 40% 0% 10% Yes (1995) 
Lao PDR 40% 5% 5% No 
Malaysia RM 5/liter 0% 15% Yes (1995) 
Myanmar 10% 1% 1% Yes (1995) 
Philippines na na na Yes (1995) 
Singapore $1.75/liter 0% 0% Yes (1995) 
Thailand 60% 10% 5% Yes (1995) 
Vietnam 59% 38% 10% Yes (2007) 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat. 
4. Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade 
 
4.1  Existing Tariff, Para-Tariffs and Non-Tariff Measures 
a. Tariffs 
The Government of Lao PDR applies the 
ASEAN Harmonized Tariff Nomenclature 
(AHTN) based on the Harmonized Tariff 
Nomenclature 2002 (HS2002), and it is 
currently in the process of introducing a 
new tariff nomenclature based on HS 
2007.31 The most-favored-nation (MFN) 
tariff structure has been simplified to the six 
tariff rates of 5, 10, 15, 20, 30 and 40 
percent, with an unweighted average tariff 
rate of 11 percent. Half of the tariff lines 
have a 5 percent rate, almost one-third 
have a 10 percent rate, nearly one-tenth percent have a 20 percent rate, and most of the 
remaining lines have a 30 or 40 percent rate (Figure 4.1).  
Some industries like beer enjoy higher tariff protection, while others like cement and steel 
receive protection in the form of non-
tariff measures.32 Most other ASEAN 
member countries also levy a high tariff 
on alcoholic beverage imports. Vietnam 
and Thailand, for example, apply a duty 
rate of 60 percent, while Indonesia 
applies the same 40 percent duty rate 
as Laos. In cement, three ASEAN 
member countries protect their 
industries with higher tariff rates than 
Laos, most notably Vietnam, which 
levies a 38 percent tariff on its imports 
of cement. Similarly, in steel, three 
countries have significantly higher 
tariffs than Laos, while Cambodia’s 
tariff is modestly higher than that of 
Laos (Table 4.1).  
Under AFTA, Lao PDR has since 
January 2008 reduced tariffs on most imported products from ASEAN countries to 
between 0 and 5 percent under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme. 
Under the scheme, Laos has committed to extending MFN treatment to other ASEAN 
                                            
31 There are two types of tariffs, specific tariffs and ad varolem tariffs. The specific tariff charges a fixed amount 
for each unit of goods imported, and the ad varolem tariffs charges a specified percentage of the c.i.f. value of 
imported goods. In Lao PDR, tariffs refer to ad varolem rates. 
32 In this study, we use ‘non-tariff measures’ interchangeably with ‘non-tariff barriers’, following the WTO 
Secretariat’s terminology.  
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member countries. None of the products on the General Exclusion List and Products on 
the Sensitive List that are to be phased into 0-5 percent tariffs by January 2015 relate to 
beer, cement or steel bars. What is noteworthy is that the degree of protection of ASEAN 
member countries within the CEPT scheme is considerably lower for the products in the 
industries covered in this study. In beer, only Indonesia retained the same high tariff rate 
as Laos, while Brunei and Malaysia have included the product in their General Exception 
list. Lao has, however, agreed to reduce the CEPT rate on beer to 20 percent by 2014 and 
to 0 by 2015. The CEPT rate is currently on 0 for steel bars and the rate for cement will be 
reduced to 0 in 2015 (Table 4.2).  
The ability to compete both domestically and in international markets is partly attributable 
to production costs, and those costs can be undermined by tariffs on material inputs to 
domestic industries. Table 4.3 shows the duty rates on tradable inputs of beer, cement 
and steel. On first viewing, it appears that in cement there are several countries that 
impose unduly high tariffs on their material inputs among ASEAN members, namely, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Laos. But an assessment of the import tax 
burden based on the production cost coefficients on those tradable goods reveals an even 
greater burden of those same countries: in Laos the weighted-average tariff on material 
inputs for cement is 7.3 percent, while it is 8.5 percent in Cambodia, 7.7 percent in 
Vietnam and 7.3 percent in Malaysia. In steel, the opposite pattern exists: the production-
weighted average duty rates on the material inputs are lower than the unweighted average 
in Cambodia (5.2% weighted average versus 6.1 unweighted average) and Malaysia (4% 
weighted average versus 7.3% unweighted average). Only in Laos is the nominal rate of 
protection (NPR) of 5 percent on the industry output the same as the NPR for material 
inputs. 
Additionally, the existence of tariffs on tradable inputs that are also used in export-oriented 
industries can create an anti-export bias.  Those industries attempting to export rather 
than sell in the domestic market receive no output tariff protection but must nevertheless 
pay the protected input costs of tradable inputs.  While duties on inputs could be offset by 
a duty-drawback scheme, no such system exists in Laos. 
b. Para-Tariff Measures 
Excise Taxes: Excise taxes are levied on beer at a rate of 50 percent, which is applied on 
top of the duty rate of 40 percent on that good.33 
                                            
33 Hence, the combined duty and excise tax paid on imported beer is M(1+t)(1+e), where M is the ad valorem 
value of imports, t is the tariff rate, and e is the excise rate. 
Table 4.2: Comparative AFTA Tariffs on Products of Selected Industries 
  Beer Cement Steel Bars 
  2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
Brunei GE GE GE 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Cambodia 20% 20% 5% 15% 10% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Indonesia 40% 40% 40% 0% 0% 0% 5% 5% 0% 
Lao PDR 1/ 40% 40% 40% 5% 5% 5% 0% 0% 0% 
Malaysia GE GE GE 0% 0% 0% 5% 5% 5% 
Myanmar 5% 5% 5% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Philippines 5% 5% 5% 0% 0% 0% 3% 3% 3% 
Singapore 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Thailand 5% 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 5% 5% 
Vietnam 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
GE = General exception 
1/ Tariff of 20% in 2014 and 0% in 2015 on beer; tariff of 0% in 2015 on cement. 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat 
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Value Added Tax: The VAT will come into force in 2010 and full implementation will take 
several years.34 It will replace the turnover tax collected on collected from imports, sales of 
goods and general services. In the case of beer, cement and steel imports, the turnover 
tax or VAT is levied on the total value of the import that includes the duty and, in the case 
of beer, the excise tax.35 
c. Non-Tariff Measures 
Despite relatively low tariff rates, Lao PDR’s trade regime is more restrictive than that of 
many other East Asian economies. Import and export licensing systems are still in place, 
although somewhat streamlined in recent years. Efforts to adopt a market-oriented 
regulatory environment are underway and the WTO accession process may require the 
conversion of some non-tariff measures to their equivalent tariffs. Currently, non-tariff 
barriers to trade (NTBs) and quantitative import restrictions remain and in the case of 
cement and steel, they are the main binding restriction.  
The following measures are currently applied to cement and steel bars as a means of 
controlling the volume of imports: 
• Automatic Licensing Measures: Cement and steel bars, among others, are considered 
to be strategic goods subject to State control. As such, they are subject to import 
licensing restrictions. 
• Quantitative Control Measures: Quantitative controls are set on the importation of steel 
bars for construction and all types of cement, among others.  
                                            
34 Decree of the President of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic on the Promulgation of the Value-Added 
Tax, Vientiane, 16 January 2007.  
35 Note that in the case of beer the excise tax is applied to the imported value that includes the tariff, and the 
VAT or turnover tax is applied to the import value that includes both the tariff and VAT. Hence, the total tax 
paid on imported beer is M(1+t)(1+e)(1+v), where M is the ad valorem value of imports, t is the tariff rate, e is 
the excise rate and v is the VAT. 
Table 4.3: Comparative MFN Tariffs on Inputs of Selected Industries 
BEER 
Input: HS code Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam 
Malted Barley 1003 0% 7% 0% 5% 0% 0% na 0% B2.75 0% 
Unmalted grains 100890 0% 7% 5% 5% 0% 0% na 0% B2.75 0% 
Sugar 170290 0% 7% 5% 10% 0% 1% na 0% 1% 0% 
Hops 130213 0% 7% 5% 10% 0% 15% na 0% 20% 27% 
Yeast 210210 0% 7% 5% 5% 15% 15% na 0% 10% 5% 
CEMENT 
Input: HS code Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam 
Limestone 2521 0% 7% 5% 5% 5% 3% na 0% 1% 10% 
Coal 2701 0% 0% 5% 5% 0% 0% na 0% 1% 0% 
Diesel 271019 $0.023/ltr 15% 0% 5% 0% 1.5% na 0% B.001 0% 
Gypsum 2520 0% 7% 5% 5% 0% 1% na 0% 5% 0% 
Clay 2508 0% 7% 5% 5% 5% 1% na 0% 1% 0% 
Cement Bags 39231090 0% 15% 20% 20% 30% 5% na 0% 0% 26% 
Refractory 6901 0% 7% 5% 5% 20% 1.5% na 0% 10% 5% 
Lubricant 3403 0% 7% 7.5% 10% 10% 1.5% na 0% 5% 5% 
Grinding Media 6804 0% 15% 5% 5% 0% 1% na 0% 5% 20% 
Spare Parts 8409 0% 7% 0% 5% 0% 1% na 0% 10% 15% 
STEEL RODS 
Input: HS code Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines 0% Thailand Vietnam 
Iron Ore 260111 0% 7% 0% 5% 0% 1% na 0% 0% 0% 
Coking coal 270112 0% 0% 5% 5% 0% 0% na 0% 0% 5% 
Scrap iron or steel 720449 0% 7% 0% 5% 0% 1% na 0% 0% 0% 
Oxygen 280440 0% 7% 5% 5% 5% 1% na 0% 5% 3% 
Ferro-alloys 720299 0% 7% 0% 5% 0% 1% na 0% 0% 0% 
Fluxes 381090 0% 7% 0% 5% 0% 5% na 0% 0% 3% 
Refractory 6901 0% 7% 5% 5% 20% 1.5% na 0% 5% 5% 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat 
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The following measure is currently applied to cement and steel bars as a means of 
controlling the price of goods: 
• Price Control Measures: Price surveillance and regulation are ruled by the Prime 
Minister's Decree No. 207/PM of 11 October 2001 which allows the Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce (MOIC) to do so for goods in general.  Price controls apply to 
domestically produced steel for construction and cement.  
4.2 Measuring Non-Tariff Barriers 
Non-tariff measures include any policy measure beyond tariffs that induce policy 
distortions at the border. Measurement of the ad valorem tariff equivalent of non-tariff 
measures consists of calculating the so-called price wedge between the border price 
equivalent of a product and its domestic price equivalent, net of the tariff on that product. 
In practice, the c.i.f. price plus customs charges and other costs, measured in local 
currency, are used to determine the border price equivalent, which is then compared with 
the domestic wholesale price to calculate the price wedge.36 The international market price 
should reflect the border price, which requires the inclusion of cost, insurance and freight 
(c.i.f.) for imported goods.37 Import duties and excise taxes are excluded because they do 
not constitute a change in resources available to the consumer, and are simply transfer 
payments from foreign suppliers to the government.  
Annex A shows the derivation of the ad valorem tariff equivalent of the non-tariff measures 
applied to cement and steel bars, as well as calculations of the nominal rates of assistance 
and consumer tax equivalent. The following are the noteworthy parts of the calculations: 
Production and Distribution (Section 1): Based on available data, tradable inputs represent 
about 30 percent and 54 percent of cement and steel rod outputs respectively. Nearly two-
thirds of cement usage in Laos originates from domestic sources, while two-thirds of steel 
rod usage originates from foreign suppliers.  
Domestic Variables (Section 2): The domestic wholesale price for cement is 764,592 kip 
per ton and for steel rods it is 10,195,417 kip per ton. The turnover tax or VAT applied to 
both domestic producers and importers is 10 percent. There is no consumer tax or subsidy 
to either producers or consumers. 
International Variables (Section 3): The c.i.f. import price for cement is US$65 a ton and 
for steel bars it is US$796 a ton. Perceptions about the quality of foreign products are 
somewhat higher than those for domestically produced goods and, as such, a factor of 1.1 
has been assigned for cement and 1.2 for steel rods. Duty rates on cement and steel rods 
are 5 percent for the final products and, based on the effective rate of protection 
calculations discussed in the next section, the cost-based weighted average duty rate on 
inputs is 5.6 percent for cement and 5 percent for steel bars. Formal exchange controls on 
                                            
36 For applications of the methodology, see Kym Anderson and Alberto Valdes, “Distortions to Agricultural 
Incentives in Latin America”. Washington, DC. World Bank, 2008; Montague Lord, “Trade Related Policies and 
Practices in Honduras”. February 2001; and Kym Anderson and Will Martin, “Distortions to Agricultural 
Incentives in Asia”. Washington, DC. World Bank, 2009. 
37 Note that c.i.f. includes the free on board (f.o.b.) cost at point of export, freight charges to point of import, 
insurance charges, uploading from ship to pier at port; it excludes import duties and subsidies, port charges at 
port of entry for taxes, handling, storage, and agents’ fees. Free on board (f.o.b.) includes all charges to get 
goods on board at the harbour of the exporting country, local marketing and transportation costs, local port 
charges including taxes, storage, loading, fumigation, agents’ fees, export taxes and subsidies, project 
boundary price.  
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the kip have been lifted and the gap between the official and ‘parallel market’ rates has 
been eliminated. The official exchange rate can therefore be considered to be the 
equilibrium exchange rate.38 
Price Margins (Section 4): According to industry data, the markup prices for domestic 
cement and steel are 4-5 percent. 
Self-Sufficiency (Sections 5-6): Based on available data, the self-sufficiency index of Laos 
in cement is 42 percent and in steel bars it is 19 percent, where self-sufficiency is defined 
as  the share of production in total supplies available for domestic use. 
International Prices (Section 7):  The undistorted international prices of cement and steel 
bars equal the c.i.f. import price denominated in US dollars, adjusted for consumer 
perceptions about the quality of the foreign-sourced products and converted to kip. For 
exportables, the f.o.b. export price is used, with the same adjustments as in the case of 
imports. 
Nominal Rate of Assistance and Consumer Tax Equivalent (Sections 8 and 9): The 
nominal rate of assistance (NRA) to producers is defined as the percentage by which 
government policies have raised gross returns to producers above what they would be 
without the government’s intervention.39 The consumer tax equivalent (CTE) is the 
percentage increase in the price paid by consumers as a result of the government policies. 
In the case of both cement and steel, the difference between the domestic price and 
border price resulting from the policy distortions at the border are adjusted by the turnover 
tax or VAT since the importer is also subject to that tax. For the CTE, the turnover tax or 
VAT is not included, so the tax equivalent for the consumer is the additional price that he 
or she must pay for the domestic good over and above what would have been paid at the 
undistorted international price. 
Tariff Equivalent of Non-Tariff Measures (Sections 10 and 11): Non-tariff measures from 
policies extending beyond tariffs that induce policy distortions at the border exclude the 
turnover tax or since both domestic producers and importers are subject to the tax. They 
do, of course, exclude direct duty rates so the rates applicable to cement and steel are 
subtracted from the measured price wedge between the border price equivalent of cement 
and steel and their domestic price equivalents. The calculated ad valorem tariff equivalent 
of cement is nearly 11 percent and that for steel bars is 12 percent. Overall, in cement 
NTBs account for about two-thirds of the total ad valorem tariff equivalent of both tariffs 
and NTBs to trade, and tariffs account for the remaining one-third. In steel, NTBs account 
for about 70 of the total ad valorem tariff equivalent of both tariffs and NTBs to trade, and 
tariffs account for the remaining 30 percent. 
4.3 Effective Rates of Protection 
While the tariff on beer, cement and steel iron imports protects domestic producers, tariffs 
                                            
38 Note, however, that an equilibrium exchange rate can also be considered to be the rate at which the trade or 
overall balance of payments for the country is in equilibrium. For the methodology on how to calculate the 
equilibrium exchange rate and its application to Vietnam, see Montague Lord, “A Balance of Payments Model 
for Vietnam”. Manila, Asian Development Bank, 1998. 
39 In this section, we follow the simplified definition for the ERA used by Kym Anderson and Will Martin, 
“Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Asia”. Washington, DC. World Bank, 2009. It does not take into 
account each products value added. The interested reader can use the calculations in the section that follows 
on the effective rates of protection for the industries, where value added calculations are provided for the 
industries. 
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Table 4.4: Comparative Effective 
Rates of Protection in Cement and 
Steel Bar Industries 
  Cement Steel 
Brunei 0.0% 0.0% 
Cambodia 58.5% 14.0% 
Indonesia -5.3% 26.2% 
Lao PDR 9.5% 6.5% 
Malaysia -5.2% 45.3% 
Myanmar 1.7% 1.6% 
Philippines na na 
Singapore 0.0% 0.0% 
Thailand 38.2% 13.2% 
Vietnam 648.6% 25.9% 
 
on inputs used in their production reduce the competitiveness of the domestic industry. 
The effective rate of protection (ERP) measures these effects by considering tariffs applied 
to imports of raw materials and intermediate goods that affect the price of the final good.40 
In particular, the ERP measures how tariffs on a product and its tradable inputs jointly 
affect the value-added of a particular activity. When only the nominal rate of protection 
(NRP) is calculated, the tariff on beer, cement and steel rod imports suggests that 
domestic production will be encouraged to increase their output. However, whether they 
increase their output depends not only on the tariff on the products’ imports, but on the 
tariffs applied to inputs used in their manufacture. While domestic producers are given an 
implicit subsidy on their production when there are tariffs on competing imports, they also 
face a tax on their imported inputs, which can neutralize the effect of the implicit subsidy. 
The ERP therefore measures the net protection on the beer, cement and steel production 
processes, rather than simply the gross protection on the industry’s output. Annex B 
provides details of the way that ERPs for the selected industries have been calculated. In 
this section, we report on the results of those calculations.  
The ERPs for the cement and steel bar industries of Lao show that the tariffs have had a 
fairly neutral impact on the industries. For cement it is 9.5 percent and for steel bars it is 
6.5 percent. The fact that they are positive reflects the absence of tariffs on non-tradables, 
rather than a positive differential between the tariffs on outputs and those on inputs. This 
phenomenon can be readily appreciated by the fact that the tariff on steel bars is 5 percent 
and all the tariffs on tradable inputs for that industry are also 5 percent. In the case of 
cement, the tariff on the product is also 5 percent, while the tariffs on tradable inputs range 
from 5 to 20 percent. However, the input cost-weighted average of those tariffs is 7 
percent, that is, fairly close to the amount of protection given to the final product.  
By itself, the ERPs provide limited information about 
the amount of protection afforded the industry. 
Although the results show that the amount of 
protection has been fairly neutral for both industries, 
the more interesting question is how that protection 
compares with that given by other countries to those 
same industries. Table 4.4 shows that comparative 
ERPs for cement and steel bars in the ASEAN 
member countries, using the same cost of production 
structures but applying the actual tariffs on the 
product outputs and tradable inputs of those 
industries in each country. In the case of cement, 
three countries have significantly higher ERPs than 
Laos. Vietnam in particular protects its cement 
industry to a far greater degree than Cambodia and 
Thailand, though the latter two countries have higher rates of protection on the industry 
than Laos. The implication of this comparative analysis for the cement industry is that Laos 
                                            
40 The effective rate of protection (ERP) measures how tariffs on a product and its tradable inputs jointly affect 
the value-added of a particular activity. When only the nominal rate of protection (NRP) is calculated, the 
imposition of a tariff on an imported good suggests that domestic producers of that product will be encouraged 
to increase their output. However, whether they increase output depends not only on the tariff on the import, 
but on the tariffs applied to inputs used in their production processes. While domestic producers are given an 
implicit subsidy on their production when there are tariffs on competing imports, they also face a tax on their 
imported inputs, which can neutralize the effect of the implicit subsidy. The ERP therefore measures the net 
protection on the production processes, rather than simply the gross protection on an industry’s output. 
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could adopt more protective tariff measures for the industry and still be in line with other 
ASEAN countries that are WTO members. In the case of steel, five countries protect their 
industries to a significantly greater extent than Laos. Malaysia, in particular, has a much 
higher degree of protection than the other countries, though Vietnam, Indonesia, 
Cambodia and Thailand all protect their industries more than Laos. Like cement, the 
comparative analysis points to the fact that Laos could use more protective tariff measures 
and still be in line with other ASEAN countries that are WTO members. However, it is 
important to emphasize that these results refer to the protection given to the industries 
through tariffs and exclude non-tariff measures.  
4.4 Total Protection Given to Selected Industries 
Table 4.5 summarizes the ad valorem tariff equivalents (TEs) of the selected industries. 
Under the present regime, beer receives the highest level of protection (110%), followed 
by steel bars (17%) and 
cement (16%). The actual 
level of effective rate of 
protection (ERP) with the 
existing tariffs and TEs of 
the non-tariff measures is 
62 percent for cement and 
50 percent for steel bars. 
Lowering the existing 
tariffs to zero on tradable 
inputs in the cement and 
steel bar industries would 
increase the ERP on 
those industries to 84 
percent for cement and 67 
percent for steel bars. It would also create greater transparency, streamline administrative 
and bureaucratic procedures, and facilitate business practices in the country. 
 
Table 4.5: Tariffs and Ad Valorem Tariff Equivalent of NTBs in 
Selected Industries, Applied to ERP Estimates 
  Beer Cement Steel Bars 
Tariff 40% 5% 5% 
Excise Tax 50% 0% 0% 
Tariff + Excise Tax 1/ 110% 5% 5% 
Non-tariff barriers to trade 0% 11% 12% 
Total Ad Valorem Tariff Equivalent 110% 16% 17% 
Effective Rates of 
Protection with Tariff 
and Ad Valorem 
Tariffs Equivalents 
of NTBs 
With Existing 
Duties on 
Tradable Inputs 
na 62% 50% 
With Zero (0) 
Duties on 
Tradable Inputs 
na 84% 67% 
1/ Calculated as t + (1+t)e, where t=tariff and e=excise tax. 
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5. Impact of WTO Accession on Selected Industries  
5.1  Overview of Benefits and Costs of Accession 
There are currently 153 members of the WTO and, except for Lao PDR, all ASEAN 
member countries have acceded to the WTO. While the accession experiences of 
countries vary greatly, the effects generally refer to two broad areas: first, the impact of 
accession on the legal and regulatory framework governing the economy and, second, the 
impact of accession on trade in goods and services and other key macro-economic 
variables affecting business activity and government revenue. The distinctive affects on 
business and government activity are notable.  
• For the government, the immediate impact can be a reduction in trade tax revenue that 
accompanies commitments to lower taxes, although the transmission effects of liberalization 
normally create dynamic gains for government revenue over the medium term. From a legal 
and regulatory perspective, the WTO accession process strengthens domestic policies and 
institutions for the conduct of international trade in both goods and services.  
• For the private sector, the WTO accession process improves the ease and security of market 
access to major export markets, and it provides access to a dispute settlement mechanism for 
trade issues. Without WTO membership, most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment is granted on a 
voluntary basis by WTO trading partners. There is evidence that the incidence of anti-dumping 
actions is much higher against non-WTO members than against members.41  
Much of the empirical evidence on the impact of WTO accession has focused on the 
magnitude of trade changes associated with membership. Initial estimates of the impact of 
the Uruguay Round produced global gains worth $500 billion annually from trade 
liberalization and the OECD estimated that agricultural trade liberalization would generate 
an additional trade of $200 billion annually.42 But actual commitments from member 
countries fell short of expectations and the gains were accordingly reduced. Differences 
among estimates are often due to two major modeling approaches. Some computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models assume that products are differentiated both across 
firms and countries so competition among firms is imperfect, while others assume that 
products within the same product category produced domestically are homogeneous, 
while products originating in different countries are imperfectly substitutable.43 Additionally, 
some models hold capital stock fixed (static models), while other models allow for capital 
accumulation in response to changes in investment, which tends to generate larger overall 
effects than those where capital is fixed. More recent estimates based on simulations of 
the Doha negotiations show overall welfare gains from multilateral trade liberalization in 
the Doha negotiations, so the models are unambiguously clear that multilateral trade 
                                            
41 Constantine Michalopoulos, “WTO Accession”. World Bank, 2001. 
42 For an assessment of the Uruguay Round estimates, see also J. Francois, “Assessing the Results of 
General Equilibrium Studies of Multilateral Trade Negotiations”. Policy Issues in International Trade and 
Commodities Study Series 3, United Nation Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva: UNCTAD, 2000, 
and J. Whalley, “What Can the Developing Countries Infer from the Uruguay Round Models for Future 
Negotiations”. Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study Series 4, United Nation Conference 
on Trade and Development, Geneva: UNCTAD, 2000. 
43 The assumption that products originating in different countries are imperfectly substitutable requires the 
estimate of so-called Armington elasticities, that is, trade substitution elasticities. 
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liberalization would bring global benefits. 44 Conflicting results have been reported in a 
prominent study using a gravity model for a large sample of countries that yielded 
surprisingly robust estimates.45 The model, however, failed to distinguish between country 
asymmetries and other studies have shown that liberalization does promote trade, but 
unevenly across industries, sectors and countries.46  
The more productive approach to examining comparative experiences is therefore based 
on country and sector or industry-specific empirical studies of trade liberalization.47 Often 
these studies find a strong positive and significant effect of WTO membership on the 
formation of trade relationships and on the volume of a country’s trade. Nonetheless, 
recent country-based estimates of the impact of liberalization and WTO accession on 
trade vary greatly because of the differences in national experiences.48 
Given the experiences of other countries, what then are the lessons for Lao PDR? A 
succinct though possibly incomplete list of conditions emerging from WTO membership for 
Laos is the following: (a) the establishment of a most-favorable-regime policy resulting in a 
level playing field for all member countries; (b) the creation of a national regime policy 
preventing discrimination between imported and local goods and services; (c) the shift of 
trade controls to tariff-based measures; (d) the achievement of openness and 
transparency in trade policy; (e) the maintenance of internal markets that are consistent 
with WTO rules; (f) the creation of favorable conditions for businesses to operate by 
reducing the costs of their doing business; and (g) the creation of a formal mechanisms for 
settling trade disputes.  
We can summarize these effects for Laos into the following three categories: (1) the 
strengthening of domestic policies and institutions for the conduct of international trade in 
both goods and services; (b) improvements in the ease and security of market access to 
                                            
44 See K. Anderson, W. Martin and Van Der Mensbrugghe, “Market and Welfare Implications of the Doha 
Reform Scenarios”, In Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda, edited by K. Anderson 
and W. Martin, Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2005; and J. Francois, H. Van Meijl, and F. Van Tongeren, 
“Trade Liberalization and Developing Countries under the Doha Round”. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4032, 
2003. 
45 A. K. Rose, “Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?”. American Economic Review 94, 1: 98-
114, 2003. 
46 A. Subramanian and S.J. Wei, “The WTO Promotes Trade: Strongly but Unevenly”. NBER Working Paper 
No. 10024, 2003. 
47 For Laos, it is useful to examine a country that had undergone the accession process and shared some of 
its characteristics. The case of Cambodia’s successful recent WTO accession has been examined thoroughly 
in Sok Simana’ s report “Cambodia and WTO” (Asian Development Bank Institute, 2005) and the negotiating 
process is used extensively as an illustration for other countries. Like Laos, the market size of Cambodia is 
relatively small (12 million consumers versus 6.8 million in Laos) and about one-third percent of the population 
of both countries are living below the poverty line. Cambodia has access to the markets of its ASEAN 
neighbors, as does Laos, but neighboring countries often produce products that are similar to one another, 
thereby creating trading limitations. For that reason Cambodia found it necessary to look at the world market 
as a whole to find better comparative advantages for its products, especially in the EU and US markets. 
Cambodia and Lao PDR are agriculture-based economies, with 75 to 85 percent of their labor force employed 
in the agricultural sector. Finally, both Lao PDR and Cambodia are receiving special privileges as least 
developed countries (LDCs). 
48 For example, one study found that Ecuador’s manufacturing imports fell after its WTO accession in 1996. 
However, this apparently surprising finding is easy to understand when one observes that Ecuador raised its 
applied tariffs across the board in the years after WTO accession, something that was possible in view of the 
binding overhang of its WTO tariff commitments. See M. Kennett, S.J. Evenett, and J. Gage, “Evaluating WTO 
Accessions: Legal and Economic Perspectives”, 2005. 
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major export markets; and (c) access to a dispute settlement mechanism for trade issues. 
The results support a number of fundamental objectives established by the Government in 
its NSEDP 2006-2010. First, it supports the Government’s aim to further integrate the 
country into the world economy by providing greater exports through more predictable 
access to foreign markets, which WTO membership provides. Second, WTO membership 
tends to attract more foreign direct investments and greater foreign business involvement 
with the country. Thirdly, for transition economies like Laos, WTO membership signals a 
commitment towards a market-based economy since accession facilitates the reform 
process. For Laos, therefore, WTO accession can improve important components of the 
national business environment which, in turn, has sizeable domestic payoffs. 
5.1.1. Benefits of Liberalization 
One way to consider a trade liberalization program is to consider the cost of not 
undertaking reforms. The forgone benefits can be divided into the following key indicators 
used as benchmarks for Lao PDR’s medium-term development strategy: 
Economic Growth – Countries that have undertaken reforms to liberalize and streamline 
trade have grown faster than those that have not.49 Higher growth rates result from static 
gains associated with an improved allocation of resources in the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors, and from dynamic gains resulting from greater access to technology and 
knowhow that allow producers in Laos to move closer to the international technological 
frontier.  
Private Sector Development – In designing its WTO negotiating strategy, it is important 
that the Government distinguish between its direct revenue-generating interests and the 
private sector’s profit maximization objectives. The revenue-generating effects of tariff 
reductions are negative in the short run but likely to be positive in the medium to long run 
as the overall volume of trade increases. In contrast, the private sector will benefit from 
lower prices for inputs and the more efficient allocation of resources for those activities in 
the tradable and non-tradable sectors.  
Consumer Gains – Consumer gains from lower prices in previously protected industries 
are one of the greatest, yet often unrecognized benefits of trade liberalization. They 
usually go unnoticed because, unlike producer groups that are concentrated and often 
well-organized, consumers are numerous and lack organizational capabilities. Lao PDR’s 
poor households that could benefit from cheaper construction materials like cement and 
steel are the most underrepresented segment of the economy, notwithstanding their large 
numbers. 
Employment Generation – Higher output growth in competitive sectors and the reallocation 
of resources into labor-intensive activities where Laos has a comparative advantage would 
give rise to higher rates of labor utilization. With liberalization, employment would increase 
in competitive industries producing domestic and export-oriented goods like processed 
fruits and vegetables, and decrease in inefficient but protected import-competing 
industries.  
Poverty Alleviation – Openness to trade has been shown to be pro-poor, raising the mean 
income of the poor and improving the distribution of income. The Government’s emphasis 
                                            
49 Recent evidence based on multi-country studies showing robust positive effects of trade liberalization on 
growth, openness and investment rates include Wacziarg, R., and K.H. Welch, “Trade Liberalization and 
Growth: New Evidence”. NBER Working Paper Series No. 10152, December 2003, and references therein. 
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on economic growth as a strategy for alleviating poverty is founded on the large and 
growing empirical evidence showing that sustainable economic growth rates successfully 
lower poverty levels.50 Lao PDR’s growth elasticity of poverty is currently estimated at 0.5. 
51 However, less than half of that elasticity is explained by inequality changes, indicating 
that economic policies have been pro-poor neutral and suggesting that poverty alleviation 
that relies on economic growth alone is ineffective.52 Instead, government policies and 
programs that lowered inequality could significantly reduce the magnitude of poverty in an 
effort to achieve its Millennium Development Goal to halve poverty by one-half by 2015. 
Pro-poor trade policies aimed at opening the economy could support that process.  
5.1.2. Costs of Liberalization 
There are, of course, costs associated with trade liberalization. First, protected industries 
like those of cement and steel would be subject to increased competition from imported 
goods. The resulting contraction in non-competitive import-substituting industries, 
however, would be offset by an overall increase in exports associated with the reduction of 
the bias against exports using imported inputs that were previously subject to significant 
duties and processing costs. Offsetting movements between these industries are unlikely 
to occur simultaneously and a period of transition would probably occur, during which time 
the contraction in output in the import-competing industries could exceed the increase in 
output of efficient export-oriented industries. Output loses could therefore occur in the 
short run, although past experience of countries liberalizing their imports show that a net 
increase in output tends to occur in the medium term and the amount of the net increase is 
usually large.  
A second cost of adjustment that can parallel output losses relates to employment shifts. 
Evidence from other countries nonetheless suggests that employment adjustment costs 
are small. In the case of Laos the beer, cement and steel industries represent a relatively 
small proportion of Lao PDR’s total output, and employment shifts would represent a small 
proportion of overall employment adjustments in the economy. Sector specific adjustments 
would therefore be small, and much of the adjustments would be absorbed by normal 
turnover rates that occur over a two to three year period.53  
A third cost to be considered is the loss of tariff revenues as tariff rates are reduced. The 
likely reduction in tariff revenues for Laos is probably not substantial since tariff revenue 
from the three industries is currently small. Compared with the gains from import 
liberalization for the tradable and non-tradable sectors, the revenue losses are unlikely to 
be significant in the medium term. Finally, as mentioned in the previous section, there is a 
                                            
50 For example, studies carried out for a cross-section of countries by Dollar and Kraay (2000), Chen and 
Ravallion (2000), Gallup et al. (1998) and Lundberg and Squire (2000) have demonstrated that, on average, 
economic growth at the national level leads to a proportional growth in the incomes of the poor within those 
countries. 
51 Ginalyn Komoto and Susan Stone, “Determining Poverty Impacts on Lao People’s Democratic Republic and 
Cambodia: Reconciling Household and GTAP Data”.  ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 141, July 2009.  
52 Nanak Kakwani and Ernesto M. Pernia, “Pro-Poor Growth and Income Inequality”. Asian Development 
Bank, October 2000.  
53 Unfortunately there are few empirical studies on employment-related effects from WTO accession since 
most studies have focused on trade and output shift without addressing the labor market. An exception is the 
study on Azerbaijan’s WTO accession by M. Lord and V. Ahmadov, “Azerbaijan’s WTO Accession Process 
and Its Potential Impact on Vulnerable Non-Competitive Segments of the Economy”. Prepared for 
USAID/Azerbaijan. Baku, October 2008.  
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distributional effect between the public and private sectors. Short-term revenue losses for 
the Government would not translate to a general welfare loss if the public expenditure that 
had to be cut to accommodate the revenue loss had a smaller rate of return than that of 
the private sector.  
5.2 Reform Strategies 
As part of Lao PDR’s accession to the WTO, the accession working party will likely attach 
a number of annexes to the protocol that are legally binding and address specific issues 
related to Lao PDR’s trade regime. As with all other accessions, the annexes will have 
been the focus of the ongoing negotiations and will provide WTO members with 
guarantees that the reforms or other transitional measures promised by Laos will actually 
be implemented. As such, they will represent a kind of a negotiated timetable for bringing 
Lao PDR’s trade regime into full conformity with the WTO's rules and obligations.  
As part of those negotiations, Lao PDR is likely to undertake specific reforms of its trade 
regime covering tariff and non-tariff measures impacting on the selected industries 
covered by this study. Those reforms will undoubtedly be made in the context of the 
broader trade strategy of the Government, but in this section we limit the analysis of 
alternative reforms proposed to the three selected industries. As such, this section 
assesses the implications of different scenarios of tariff reforms as part of the WTO 
accession process on various performance indicators, including those related to the 
industry, government tax revenue, and employment effects.  
In particular, we consider the transformation of non-tariff measures to ad valorem tariff 
equivalents, and the application of alternative tariff reform strategies on the beer, cement 
and steel bar industries. Alternative tariff structures and their associated effects on output 
and trade tax revenue are jointly assessed for the selected industries in an effort to identify 
common policy prescriptions for reforms. The current estimates provide for tariffication of 
non-tariff measures and the application of both the existing ad valorem tariff and tariff 
equivalent rates of NTBs to be applied to the three industries. 
Free trade is used as the benchmark against which two of the most commonly applied 
reform strategies are measured:  
 Free Trade: In the absence of any protection, all tariffs would be zero and so the NRPs and 
the ERPs would also be zero. 
The following two tariff structures are commonly invoked when reforming trade regimes: 
 Tariff Escalation. This strategy provides for tariff rate increases with the stage of processing 
of a product. It promotes infant industries and those industries with export potential by 
allowing their inputs to be taxed at a lower rate than competing finished products.  
 Uniform Tariff. A single tariff on both inputs and outputs would afford some degree of 
effective protection since non-tradables have a zero implicit tariff burden.  
As a transition mechanism, two other reform strategies can be considered that support a 
transition to a uniform tariff: 
 Combination of Multi-tier Strategy with Uniform Tariff. This combination affords domestic 
industries transitional protection while moving towards a uniform tariff. 
 Combination of Concertina Method with Multi-tier or Uniform Tariff Strategies. The 
concertina method aims to gradually reduce individual tariffs from their highest level to their 
next lowest level. It is often used to move towards the implementation of a uniform tariff, but 
can also be used with a multi-tier tariff strategy. 
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Table 5.1: Effective Rates of Protection of Tariff 
Reforms with Ad Valorem Tariff Equivalents of NTBs  
  
NRP on 
Outputs 
NRP 
on 
Inputs 
Effective Rate 
of Protection 
(ERP) 
Beer 
Tariff 
Escalation 110% 0% na 
Uniform 
Tariff 110% 110% na 
Cement1/ 
Tariff 
Escalation 16% 0% 84% 
Uniform 
Tariff 16% 16% 46% 
Steel 
Bars1/ 
Tariff 
Escalation 17% 0% 67% 
Uniform 
Tariff 17% 17% 23% 
1/ Assumes that non-tariff measures are converted to tariff 
equivalents 
Note: NRP denotes nominal rate of protection 
5.3 Impact of Reforms on Effective Rates of Protection 
Effective rates of protection (ERP) would increase considerably if a multi-tier tariff structure 
were applied to tariffs and the ad valorem tariff equivalents of non-tariff measures in the 
cement and steel bar industries. 
With a multi-tiered system that 
applied the actual tariff plus tariff 
equivalent (TE) of NTBs, the ERP 
for cement would increase from its 
existing level of 62 percent to 84 
percent; for steel bars it would 
increase from 50 percent to 67 
percent. In contrast, the use of a 
uniform tariff that applied the same 
tariffs plus TEs to both outputs and 
inputs would lower the ERPs to 46 
percent for cement and 23 percent 
for steel bars. Even though the 
tariffs on inputs and outputs are the 
same under a uniform tariff, the ERP 
is positive since input tariffs only 
cover a portion of total production costs, the remaining costs being attributable to non-
tradables.54 The implication of these findings is that protection of the cement and steel bar 
industries is more effective under a multi-tier system in which tariffs on tradable inputs are 
eliminated and the ad valorem equivalent tariff is applied to existing non-tariff measures.  
5.4 Impact of Reforms on Production  
The estimates of effective rates of protection for the cement and steel industries are 
suggestive of whether different tariff structures will more or less favor or threaten their 
activities. They are indicative of the 
potential direction of change in resource 
pull than of the output magnitudes 
involved. Predicting the quantitative 
impact of liberalization requires supply-
side analysis, for which we begin with a 
graphic illustration of the impact of the 
trade liberalization on any of the selected 
industries.  
Our approach assumes constant non-
tradable factor prices associated with 
tariff changes, and so it is legitimate only 
to the extent that this situation is 
approximately the case. In reality, a 
significant restructuring of relative output 
prices would lead to changes in the demand for such non-traded factors, i.e., land, labor, 
and capital, and so to changes in the factor prices. Tradable inputs prices are assumed 
                                            
54 Data on production costs of the beer industry were not available and, consequently, ERP were unable to be 
calculated for that industry. 
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fixed on world markets, and domestic prices of these inputs therefore depend only on 
changes in the input tariff rates. This maintained assumption of fixed non-traded factor 
prices in Laos following reforms in the trade regime can be viewed as roughly legitimate 
since overall outputs of the beer, cement and steel industries are not dominant in the 
economy. 
The approach used to estimate the impact of trade reform on the selected industries is 
illustrated in Figure 5.1, which represents an industry supply curve diagram with initial 
price and quantity supplied given by P1 and Q1. When tariffs are changed on inputs and 
output simultaneously, two forces are at work in the industry. First, a change in the input 
tariffs will alter costs and so shift the supply curve up or down depending on whether unit 
costs have increased or decreased due to the tariff changes. Suppose that the tariffs on 
inputs are lowered, causing unit costs of production to fall and the supply curve to shift 
downward to S2. For export-oriented industries like part of the beer industry in Laos, the 
output price remains at the initial level P1, and output expands to Q1* by an amount 
dependent upon the magnitude of the cost reduction and the price elasticity of supply. In 
the case of import-substitution industries, however, the output price is also altered by tariff 
elimination on the final product, so that there is an additional adjustment represented by a 
movement along the new supply curve. In the present diagram, it is assumed that the 
output tariff is lowered so that price falls to P2, inducing a new equilibrium price and 
quantity at P2 and Q2, the quantity change 
depending again on the magnitude of the 
output price change and the supply elasticity. 
Clearly, even if all tariffs are reduced, output 
may rise or fall. The net effect of tariff 
reforms on output and employment at the 
industry level is therefore an empirical issue.  
In order to calculate the effects of tariff 
reforms, we first estimated the industry 
supply elasticities using a distributed lag 
model.55 The price and income elasticities 
are reported in Table 5.2. The average 
elasticities of price and income are 0.8 and 
2.1 respectively. However, there are considerable variations among the industry products. 
Cement is most responsive to price variation, followed closely by beer. Steel bar 
production is price inelastic. Shifts in the supply curves associated with input tariff changes 
are calculated as the change in input tariffs weighted by each input’s total non-factor costs. 
Movements along the new supply curve resulting from output tariff changes and cost-
change induced equilibrating changes are then calculated using the elasticity estimates. 
For import-substituting industries, both cost-induced supply-adjustments and price-induced 
changes in output are calculated, whereas only cost-induced supply adjustments are 
estimated for export-oriented activities of the beer industry, since it does not benefit from 
the protected domestic market. 
                                            
55 The supply relationship for production, Q, with independent variables price, P, and domestic income, Y, is 
lnQt = α30 + α31lnQt-1 + α32lnPt + α33lnYt + µ3. The expected signs are 0 < α31 < 1; α32, α33 > 0. 
Table 5.2: Estimated Long-Term Price and 
Income Elasticities of Selected Industries 
    Beer Cement 
Steel 
Bars 
Price 
Elasticity 
Production 0.24 0.73 0.69 
Import 
Demand -2.57 -0.73 -0.31 
Income 
Elasticity 
Production 3.27 1.79 1.13 
Import 
Demand 3.02 0.30 0.59 
Source: Estimates based on distributed lag equations. 
Estimates of domestic output supply based on 2001-
2008 data; those of import demand based on 1990-
2008 data, except in the case of beer, for which 2001-
2008 data were used. Details of the estimates are 
available from the author on request.  
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Table 5.3 illustrates the effects that tariff and NTB reforms would have on Laos’ output for 
the selected industries. The calculations show the effects of different tariff structures on 
the industries relative to a free-trade situation. In a later section, we compare these tariff 
structures relative to existing NTBs and tariffs. For import-substituting activities, the 
reforms would generally expand the value of domestic production by 13 percent. A uniform 
tariff equal to the existing tariff and ad valorem tariff equivalents of NTBs applied across 
the board to both inputs and outputs would increase production by 9 percent, whereas a 
tiered tariff system with the same tariff equivalents on outputs but a zero (0) tariff on inputs 
would increase output by 17 percent since the output price rises would increase the 
quantity supplied by that same amount without inducing any shifts in supply caused by a 
cost increase. For the portion of beer that is exported, a graduated tariff system would not 
have any effect on exports since the producer would not receive protection in the output 
market, that is, the international market, while input prices would be free of duties in the 
proposed scheme. In the case of a uniform tariff, however, the increased input prices 
would have a negative effect on production and output would contract significantly. The 
portion of beer production directed to the export market is currently low, so the change in 
value is small. Nonetheless, over time the impact could be much greater since the industry 
aims to expand its entry into niche foreign markets.  
5.5 Impact of Reforms on Vulnerable Segments of the Economy 
The vulnerable segments of an economy facing a potentially negative impact from trade 
liberalization can be classified into the following three broad segments:  
 Import substituting industries that are protected by high tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to 
trade, especially those whose production is dominated by micro, small and medium size 
enterprises (MSMEs);  
 The poor who are susceptible both to (a) price-related changes in the goods that they produce 
and consume, and (b) government support programs for the poorest members of society, 
financed in whole or in part by trade tax revenues; and 
 Non-tradables industries that depend on imported inputs and compete with tradable industries 
for labor. 
Protection of the beer, cement and steel bar industries will raise the ad valorem tariff or its 
tariff equivalent and therefore the price of imported products for those industries. However, 
Table 5.3: Industrial Production Shift-Analysis of Alternative Tariff Structures Relative to Free Trade 
  
Class Tariff Reform  
Base 
Value Percent Change Change in 
Value 
Percent 
Change in 
Value Mil.Kip Cost Qty1 Price Qty2 
Beer  
Import-
Sub 
Uniform Tariff        601  110.0% -13.2% 110.0% 26.4% 79.2 13.2% 
Two-Tier Tariff        601  0.0% 0.0% 110.0% 26.4% 158.5 26.4% 
Export-
Oriented 
Uniform Tariff            2  110.0% -13.2% 0.0% 0.0% -0.3 -13.2% 
Two-Tier Tariff            2  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 
Cement Import-Sub 
Uniform Tariff        636  15.8% -3.4% 15.8% 11.4% 51.1 8.0% 
Two-Tier Tariff        636  0.0% 0.0% 15.8% 11.4% 72.7 11.4% 
Steel 
Bars 
Import-
Sub 
Uniform Tariff        243  17.1% -6.3% 17.1% 11.8% 13.3 5.5% 
Two-Tier Tariff        243  0.0% 0.0% 17.1% 11.8% 28.6 11.8% 
Source: Calculations based on estimated elasticities in Table 5.2, and cost of production data in Annex B. For beer, 
where cost of production data are not available, it is assumed that half of the non-factor costs are from tradable products. 
Also for beer, the base value for import-substitution is equal to production minus exports; for export-oriented activities the 
base value is the current amount of exports. For the construction industry, the base value is equal to production since all 
output is destined to the domestic market.  
IMPLICATIONS OF WTO ACCESSION FOR SELECTED DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES OF LAOS    
 
31 
the effect on wages and employment is more ambiguous. Trade reforms have been found 
to lead to substantial dynamic benefits to economies from direct price and market access 
benefits, as well as the greater investment in capital stocks and the reallocation of 
resources to reflect a country’s comparative advantage because of efficiency gains from 
increased competition.56 Economic growth has in turn been shown to successfully lower 
poverty levels.57 However, the findings refer to the average of developing countries, and 
individual experience can differ substantially.58 For Lao PDR’s import-competing 
industries, post-border price rises from protective trade taxes can trigger a substantial 
reallocation of resources between sectors of the economy.59  
For the poor the traditional link with international trade is through the labor market. 
However, the brewery sector is not a labor-intensive activity, and the neither steel nor 
cement industry is the labor-intensive industry it used to be. Nonetheless, being basic 
industries, steel and cement generate substantial growth of both upstream and 
downstream facilities. According to some estimates one person-year of employment in the 
steel industry generates 3.5 person-years of employment elsewhere.60 For Lao PDR, the 
opening of the economy to international trade could increase the demand for labor and 
allows the economy to export more labor-intensive goods and replace local production of 
capital and skill-intensive goods with imported goods.61 If poverty is concentrated among 
people who are actually or potentially part of the labor market, increasing demand will help 
to alleviate poverty. But how and whether it does so depend significantly on how the labor 
market operates.  
For non-tradable activities, lower tradable input costs can create a more competitive 
situation for the selected industries. The net welfare effect, however, will depend on the 
extent to which prices on final goods and services respond to changes in tradable inputs. 
To the extent that prices of the final products respond to lower input costs, then consumer 
welfare gains will be positive. If, in contrast, prices are downward sticky, then there will be 
neither a change in consumer welfare nor any changes in income and expenditures of 
households. The results for wages and employment suggest that employment will increase 
if prices of non-tradables fall and household expenditures on those products increase, and 
                                            
56 See, for example, Harrison, G.W., T.F. Rutherford and D.G. Tarr (1996), ‘Quantifying the Uruguay Round’, in 
The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries, edited by W. Martin and L.A. Winters, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
57 For example, studies carried out for a cross-section of countries by Dollar and Kraay (2000), Chen and 
Ravallion (2000), Gallup et al. (1998) and Lundberg and Squire (2000) have demonstrated that, on average, 
economic growth at the national level leads to a proportional growth in the incomes of the poor within those 
countries. 
58 See M. Lubker, G. Smith, and J. Weeks, “Growth and the Poor: A Comment on Dollar and Kraay”. Journal of 
International Development. 14, 555–571 (2002). Available: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/ 
Resources/LubkerSmithWeeks.pdf. 
59 Arguments for ‘tariff hoping’ by foreign direct investment (FDI) aimed at avoiding trade taxes have been 
shown to fail because outward-oriented strategies have been shown to be more successful. Empirically, FDI is 
relatively more elastic with respect to demand for exports than with respect to aggregate domestic demand. 
See H. Singh and K.W. Jun, “Some New Evidence on Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in 
Developing Countries”. Unpublished, 2004. 
60 International Iron and Steel Institute, “World Steel in Figures”. Washington, DC, 2006. 
61 UNDP, “International Trade and Human Development: Lao PDR 2006”. National Human Development 
Report, Vientiane, 2006.  
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labor displacement from the non-competitive tradable sector will be absorbed by the non-
tradable industries. 
In the present analysis, the 
employment effects associated with 
the trade reform-induced adjustments 
in Lao PDR’s beer, cement and steel 
bar industries assumes fixed labor-
output coefficients in production. 
Hence, the same export-oriented 
activities of the beer industry are likely 
to contract in terms of employment 
utilization under a uniform tariff system 
since production costs rise but output 
prices remain unaffected in the 
international market. In contrast, the 
rate of employment generation for 
import-substituting industries in 
protected markets will be the same as the estimated change in output (Table 5.4).  
Beyond these numerical estimates, it is important to underscore the multi-dimensional 
effect of trade on human development. As noted in the UNDP’s Human Development 
Report for Laos, improvements in human development and poverty reduction coincided 
with increases in trade.62 The relationships between trade and human development are 
complex, especially since trade can increase economic growth in different ways, for 
example, by expanding markets, disseminating information and knowledge, creating job 
opportunities and increasing incomes. Although the links are not always automatic, 
economic growth is necessary for human development and for a country like Laos where 
the domestic market is fairly small that growth can be driven by trade. As in the present 
study, the UNDP report also found that the potential benefits from trade in industrial and 
manufactured products were positive for employment, especially for women and 
remittances sent back to rural areas. It is therefore important to be aware of the multi-
dimensional aspects that trade can bring to poverty alleviation and the necessity of using a 
holistic approach to policy-making when considering trade reforms.  
5.6 Impact on Government Revenue 
Table 5.5 shows the revenue gains from trade taxes on beer, cement and steel bar 
imports. Beer imports are subject to both an ad valorem tariff of 40 percent plus an excise 
tax of 50 percent. The combined effect of these taxes generates about US$ 1.4 million in 
revenue. Both cement and steel bars apply duty rates of 5 percent, from which over US$ 5 
million in revenue is generated. The conversion of non-tariff measures to ad valorem tariffs 
would add another 11 and 12 percentage points to the duty rates on cement and steel 
bars. Trade tax revenue would not, however, rise by that full amount since the increase in 
trade taxes would reduce the volume of cement and steel rods imported. Trade taxes 
would be applied to smaller value of imports but it would nonetheless produce an 
additional US$10.8 million in additional revenue. The conversion of non-tariff measures 
                                            
62 UNDP, “International Trade and Human Development”. National Human Development Report. Committee 
for Planning and Investment, National Statistics Centre (NSC), and United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), Lao PDR, 2006. 
Table 5.4: Industrial Employment Adjustments from 
Alternative Tariff Structures Relative to Free Trade 
  
Class Tariff Reform 
Change in 
Employment 
Beer  
Import-
Sub 
Uniform Tariff 13.2% 
Two-Tier Tariff 26.4% 
Export-
Oriented 
Uniform Tariff -13.2% 
Two-Tier Tariff 0.0% 
Cement Import-Sub 
Uniform Tariff 8.0% 
Two-Tier Tariff 11.4% 
Steel 
Bars 
Import-
Sub 
Uniform Tariff 5.5% 
Two-Tier Tariff 11.8% 
Source: Calculated from estimates in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 
based on the assumption of fixed input-output coefficients. In 
particular, the assumption of proportionality means that a one 
percent change in output will bring about a one percent 
change in employment. Hence, over the short to medium term, 
output and employment percentage changes are the same. 
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would also reduce the administrative costs of managing those non-tariff measures and 
free government officials to engage in other activities.  
It is perhaps in the latter 
area that trade reforms 
could have their greatest 
impact since the costs of 
administering NTBs are 
considerably greater than 
the possible tax revenue 
benefits from converting 
those trade control 
measures to tariffs. 
Budgetary limitations and 
capacity limitations in both 
the central and provincial 
governments should be 
considered as part of the 
decision-making process 
leading to possible trade policy reforms. By freeing up administrative costs and human 
resources currently charged with monitoring and implementing trade control measures in 
the construction industry it would be possible to shift those resources to other productive 
areas aimed at facilitating business activity and enhancing the competitiveness of local 
businesses.  
Table 5.5: Effect on Import Value and Trade Taxes of Tariff and 
NTB Reforms in Selected Industries 
  
Industry 
 
Trade Taxes Impact 
Base 
Tax 
New 
Trade 
Tax 
Change in Trade 
Taxes 
Value 
(1000US$) Percent 
Beer Revenue Gains from Existing Taxes 0% 110% 1,427 110% 
Cement 
Revenue Gains from 
Existing Taxes 0% 5% 2,416 5% 
Revenue Gains from 
Conversion of NTBs 
to Ad Valorem Tariffs 
5% 16% 4,327 10% 
Steel 
Bars 
Revenue Gains from 
Existing Taxes 0% 5% 2,915 5% 
Revenue Gains from 
Conversion of NTBs 
to ad valorem Tariffs 
5% 17% 6,511 12% 
Source: Calculated from estimates in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 based on COMTRADE 
data in Annex C. 
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6. Recommendations on Tariff and Trade Strategies 
 
6.1 Designing Trade Policy Reforms for Selected Industries  
As a least-developed country (LDC), Lao PDR’s application for membership in the WTO is 
covered by the 2002 General Council guidelines for accelerating membership 
negotiations.63 Under those guidelines WTO Members are to exercise restraint in seeking 
concessions and commitments on trade in goods and services from acceding LDCs. 
Moreover, transitional periods and arrangements are provided under specific WTO 
Agreements to enable acceding LDCs to effectively implement commitments and 
obligations. These transitional provisions are to be granted in accession negotiations, 
taking into account individual development, financial and trade needs of Laos. However, it 
is also clear from the guidelines that the transitional periods and arrangements are to be 
accompanied by Action Plans for compliance with WTO rules, with the ultimate elimination 
of the transitional arrangements within a specified period of time. 
6.2 Arguments for Protecting Selected Industries 
Protection of the construction industry and, in large part, that of the brewery industry is 
largely based on the need for Laos to catch up in its transition to a market economy and 
therefore provide infant industry protection to those industries. That process has been 
envisioned under the WTO as it relates to LDCs and justifies protection during limited, 
time-bound period for certain industries. It recognizes that trade protection can affect the 
performance of domestic firms by influencing the competitive pressures that these firms 
face and the size of the market in which they operate. Article XVIII provides for wide 
ranging government actions to help protect and encourage infant industries, subject to 
reasonable requirements to consult and notify WTO members.  
In practice, however, subsidies are likely to be more effective in promoting industries, as 
they did in the case of the Asian tigers, since unlike border protection they can be used to 
promote industries directly.64 The problem is that restrictions imposed by the Agreement 
on Subsidy and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) prohibits the use of subsidies for non-
agricultural goods under article 3 when those subsidies depend on export performance or 
the use of domestic over imported goods to be paid to firms. There is nonetheless the 
possibility that Laos could institute those subsidies before accession and thereby have the 
option of maintain those subsidies as a WTO member country.  
6.3 Arguments for Liberalizing Selected Industries 
The relatively high level of protection given to the beer, cement and steel industries in the 
forms of tariff and non-tariff measures are against the avowed economic goals the 
Government has resolved to achieve in the medium term under its Sixth National Socio-
Economic Development Plan (2006-2010) under which exports are the main engine of 
growth for the economy. The reason is that continued protection of inefficient industries 
prevents the country from exploiting its comparative advantage for labor and resource-
intensive manufactures since it leads to movement of resources away from such activities. 
                                            
63 World Trade Organization, “Accession of Least-Developed Countries”. Document WT/L/508, 20 January 
2003. 
64 World Bank, “The East Asian Miracle”. Washington, DC, 1993. 
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Moreover, the presence of trade distortions causes investment to focus on non-
competitive activities, causing returns to investment to decline over time and 
compromising future output growth. There is already evidence that private investment is 
being attracted to non-tradable, mainly in services, rather than the tradable sectors.  For 
example, in 2007 the value of approved foreign investments directed to hotels and 
restaurants, banking and insurance, trading activities, consultancies and other services 
represented one-fourth of all approved foreign investments. In contrast, a decade earlier, 
in 1997, those same service industries represented only 2 percent of all foreign 
investments into the country.65 Finally, interest groups that have invested in activities that 
are not internationally competitive will resist reforms, creating a lobby against future 
reforms because the value of their invested capital would decline with greater external 
competition. 
The dispersion in tariffs equivalents afforded to beer, cement and steel interferes with the 
optimal allocation of the country’s resources, since the relative returns to activities are not 
determined by comparative advantage but rather by the differences in protection rates 
arising from the differential in tariffs. The higher the dispersion of tariffs, the higher is the 
deviation of activities from their most efficient use. In fact, the large differential in tariffs 
between the selected industries and others in the economy like footwear, headgear, 
rubber and plastics that have high growth potential is even more harmful than high 
protection in itself.66 If all industries were protected to the same extent, then resource 
flows will be neutral among sectors, while the combination of high protection in a few 
industries and a wide dispersion in tariffs across industries will create impediments for the 
best use of resources. 
The presence of high escalation in tariffs and tariff equivalents on non-tariff measures also 
discourage the growth of input producing industries. Laos has a comparative advantage in 
input-producing activities like wood for furniture-making, and minerals for light industries.  
When tariff escalation discriminates against these activities by providing them with low 
tariffs, entrepreneurs will favor the more protected downstream activities that may not 
have comparative advantages. Industrial development among successful developing 
countries has followed a pattern of movement from raw material and intermediate good 
production to the production of final goods, and tariff escalation can undermine efforts of 
countries like Laos to successfully industrialize.67 
6.4 Summary of Effects from Alternative Tariff Reform Strategies  
Tariff reforms in the selected industries should, in principle, be considered in the context of 
the broader trade strategy of the Government. Nonetheless, the alternative reforms 
proposed below can be applied specifically to the three industries or across a broader 
spectrum of industries and sectors. We can assess the effects of four of the most 
commonly applied reform strategies relative to a benchmark of free trade. 
 Free Trade: In the absence of any protection, all tariffs would be zero and so the 
NRPs and the ERPs would also be zero.  
                                            
65 Based on data from Ministry of Planning and Investment, reported in Department of Statistics, “Lao PDR: 
Statistical Yearbook, 2008”, Vientiane, 2009, and P.J. Gunawardana and S. Sisombat, “Trends and Patterns of 
Foreign Direct Investment in Lao PDR”. School of Applied Economics and Centre for Strategic Economic 
Studies, and Victoria Graduate School of Business, Victoria University, January 2008. 
66 World Bank, “Building Export Competitiveness in Laos: Background Report”. November 2006. 
67 World Bank, “The East Asian Miracle”. Washington, DC, 1993. 
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 Multi-tiered Method. This strategy represents a simple form of tariff escalation, 
which promotes infant industries and those industries with export potential by 
allowing their inputs to be taxed at a lower rate than competing finished products. If 
tariffication of non-tariff measures were to take place and the existing ad valorem 
tariff plus tariff equivalent rates were applied to the three industries, then the 
effective rates of protection would be over 100 percent for cement and nearly 60 
percent for steel bars.  
 Uniform Tariff. A single tariff on both inputs and outputs nonetheless affords some 
degree of effective protection since non-tradables have a zero implicit tariff burden. 
In the case of cement, the ERP is about half of its level in the multi-tiered method 
and, in the case of steel bars, the ERP is about one-third of the escalation 
approach. 
As a transition mechanism, two other reform strategies can be considered that support a 
transition to a uniform tariff: 
 Combination of Multi-tier and Uniform Tariff Strategies. This combination affords 
domestic industries transitional protection while moving towards a uniform tariff. 
 Combination of Concertina Method and Uniform Strategy. The concertina method 
aims to gradually reduce individual tariffs from their highest level to their next 
lowest level, and is often used to move towards the implementation of a uniform 
tariff. 
The results of the multi-tiered method and a uniform tariff approach are shown in Table 
6.1. The tiered method provides a higher level of effective protection to the industries for 
which data were available, and the results are also likely to hold in the case of beer. It also 
increases production and employment and reduces import volumes by a larger amount 
than in the case of a uniform tariff. In terms of protection, the tiered method is therefore 
superior to the uniform tariff for the individual industries examined. It does not, however, 
mean that the approach is better than a uniform tariff when all industries are considered 
since a uniform tariff would provide a level playing field for producers of raw materials, 
intermediate goods and final products in Laos, which could be a more effective 
industrialization strategy than protection of specific industries.  
Table 6.1: Effect of Alternative Tariff Reform Strategies 
  Beer Cement Steel Bars 
  
Tariff 
Escalation 2/ 
Uniform 
Tariff 
Tariff 
Escalation 
Uniform 
Tariff 
Tariff 
Escalation 
Uniform 
Tariff 
NRP on Outputs 110% 110% 18% 18% 15% 15% 
NRP on Inputs 0% 110% 0% 18% 0% 15% 
Effective Rate of Protection 1/ na na 101% 55% 59% 20% 
Change in  Imports (from 
free trade) 2/ -26% -13% -11% -8% -12% -5% 
Government Revenue from 
NTB Tariffication3/ na 10% 12% 
Total Government Revenue 
Effect 4/ 110% 16% 17% 
Production Volume 
Adjustments 26% 13% 11% 8% 12% 5% 
Employment Effect 26% 13% 11% 8% 12% 5% 
1/ Assumes that non-tariff measures are converted to tariff equivalents 
2/ Applies existing tariff and tariff equivalents of NTBs. 
3/ Additional government revenue relative to total value of imports with ad valorem tariff equivalent. 
4/ Total government revenue relative to total value of imports with ad valorem tariff equivalent. 
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The results also point to the effectiveness of converting non-tariff measures to tariffs. 
Tariffication would increase government revenue by an additional 16 to 17 percent over 
the current level of government revenue. Additionally the tariffication would reduce the 
administrative costs of managing the non-tariff measures and free up scarce human 
resources in the public sector for other activities. Finally, it would provide greater 
transparency and predictability, and thereby bring Lao PDR’s tariff regime closer to the 
guidelines established by the WTO.  
6.5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Guiding Principles - An optimal trade policy regime is predictable, transparent and 
administered in a way that consumers, producers and investors can rely on market signals 
provided by prices that bear some established relationship to the trade regime. As such, 
tariffs are the best known transparent instrument of protection. They provide administrative 
predictability and transparency, and they offer an easy way to accomplish tariff reductions 
in a way that signals to economic agents that the country is on the path to a market-based 
economy. For those reasons, it would be preferable to eliminate existing non-tariff 
measures that promote inefficiencies and rent-seeking and adopt a system based solely 
on tariffs as the instrument of protection. Excise and consumer taxes are consistent with a 
predictable and transparent system since they do not discriminate between foreign and 
domestic goods. 
Lessons Learned from Other ASEAN Countries – The lessons learned from the other 
ASEAN countries, especially the recent experiences of Cambodia, also an LDC, and 
Vietnam, are that protection can be effectively applied to some industries, especially those 
that are in infant stages of development, and that the most effective instrument for that 
type of protection is provided by tariffs. The reason is that tariff measures are less likely to 
lead to rent seeking and costly administrative practices, and they limit the exercise of 
possible domestic monopoly power. By making tariffs the centerpiece of trade policy, the 
ASEAN countries have brought their economic policies in line with WTO practices in which 
tariffs are, with very few exceptions, the only acceptable tool for protection. These trade 
policy adjustments have been conditional on parallel domestic policy reforms, and together 
they have provided the means by which those ASEAN countries have effectively 
integrated their economies into the global trading system. 
Transforming Non-Tariff Measures into Tariffs – The Government’s use of non-tariff 
measures in the cement and steel bar industries is based on its desire to promote them 
both as infant and strategic industries.  However, those types of measures create 
inefficiencies, and they lack transparency and predictability. In Lao PDR’s accession 
negotiations, it is likely that members will stress the need the Government to abide by 
WTO’s transparency obligations, as contained in GATT Article X. Likewise, the 
predictability principle can be ensured by providing preferences to tariffs over less 
transparent and less secure non-tariff measures such as quotas and licenses. Only 
regimes based on tariffs can ensure that the variance in protection is kept within 
observable limits.   
Tariffs on Beer – The existing nominal rate of protection (NRP) of 110 percent for the 
domestic brewer industry is considerably higher that the level of protection given to the 
domestic beer industries of other ASEAN countries. On average the tariff rate of other 
ASEAN countries is about 40 percent. Moreover, CEPT-AFTA rates are much lower in 
other countries, averaging only 11 percent compared with the 40 percent rate of Laos. 
Nevertheless, Laos is committed to reducing its CEPT-AFTA rate on beer to zero percent 
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by 2015. There is therefore considerable scope for also reducing the MFN rate to a level 
that would be more in line with other ASEAN countries over the next few years.  
Making the Industry More Competitive following WTO Accession – Lao PDR’s transition to 
a market economy along with its accession to the WTO will place increasing pressures on 
the brewery and construction industries to enhance their competitiveness without having to 
rely on protection and subsidies. While infant industry protective measures can be used to 
help that transition process, the country’s Action Plan submitted to the WTO will 
necessarily include a timeline for the elimination of WTO- inconsistent measures. That 
timeline increases the importance of introducing effective measures to support and 
facilitate the transition of these industries to maturity or enhanced those that already exist. 
Industry-specific adjustments directly affecting the industry’s production costs include: 
 Skills development through sustainable business development services that promote 
the use of advanced technologies and modern management techniques. 
 Expanded use of upstream activities within the country to lower the costs of sourcing 
supplies from neighboring countries. 
 Greater use of networking facilities and clusters to upgrade suppliers and supporting 
services. 
 Continued dissemination of modern production facilities and environmentally friendly 
production technologies. 
 Improvements in transportation and logistics to reduce costs of raw material sourcing 
and distribution to domestic markets. 
 Improved access to credit at competitive rates or soft loans from commercial and 
development banks. 
Equally important are economy-wide reforms that affect the costs of domestic business 
activity and thereby directly impact on the ability of the industries to compete with foreign 
suppliers, especially: 
 Introducing the specific trade reforms enumerated below aimed at reducing market 
distortions while concurrently supporting the industries targeted by the government’s 
industrialization program. 
 Reducing the cost of doing business in the areas identified as having low rankings in 
the country relative to those of neighboring countries that represent important 
competitors for the target industries. 
 Reviewing exchange rate policies affecting the country’s competitiveness with 
neighboring countries, particularly in the light of changes in the management of 
currencies taking place in Asian countries during the rebalancing of the global 
economy. 
Potential Trade Reforms – The contrast between the present trade regime and alternative 
regimes suggests a remaining agenda for reforms.  Such an agenda is not too difficult to 
identify and could include the following elements. 
 Initially convert existing non-tariff measures in cement to an ad valorem tariff 
equivalent of 11 percent and convert those in steel bars to an ad valorem tariff of 12 
percent to make tariffs the only instrument of protection, increase transparency, 
enhance government revenue and reduce administrative costs in the public sector.  
 Over the next few years, reduce the overall tariff level on beer to zero to bring it in line 
with CEPT-AFTA rates by 2015, and bring it in line with competitive practices of others.  
 Over the next few years, reduce the ad valorem tariff equivalent on cement and steel 
bars from their effective duty rates of 16-17 percent to more competitive MFN rates of 
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5 to 10 percent.  
 Reduce nominal tariff dispersion by moving to fewer rates in stages that would lead to 
a multi-tier structure of three to five rates. 
 Gradually reduce tariffs on inputs for the selected industries to zero to improve their 
cost competitiveness and provide greater effective rates of protection.  
 In the interim, allow duty-free access to foreign inputs through the introduction of duty 
drawback and temporary admission systems.  
While these prescriptions for the industries may appear daunting to some, without them 
there is a strong likelihood that the competitiveness of the industries will be eroded 
following the country’s accession and full implementation of the Action Plan for compliance 
with WTO rules. For the private sector, it means establishing realistic industrialization 
targets that match the country’s human and natural resource development potential; for 
the government, it means more effectively coordinating plans, programs and 
implementation projects across agencies; and for development partners and donors it 
means improve collaboration among agencies so as to ensure complementarity of 
programs and projects supporting the country’s industrial development program.  
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ANNEX A: Calculation of Ad Valorem Tariff 
Equivalents of Non-Tariff Measures for Selected 
Industries 
 
 
1 DERIVATION OF AD VALOREM TARIFF EQUIVALENTS OF NTBS Unit Source / Formula Beer Cement 
Steel 
Bars 
2 
1.
 P
R
O
D
U
C
TI
O
N
 &
 D
IS
TR
IB
U
TI
O
N
 
Inputs        
3 Material Inputs Billion Kip Industry surveys  122 45 
4 Other tradable inputs Billion Kip Industry surveys  75 41 
5 Total tradable inputs Billion Kip Line 3+4  197 87 
6 Processed Products Quantities & Values      
7 Conversion factor (share of tradable inputs in output)  Percent Line 5/9  31% 36% 
8 Production Volume Mil liters & 1000 tons Dept of Statistics 136.3 831.2 23.9 
9 Production Value Billion Kip Line 8x17 602.9 635.5 243.4 
10 Consumption Billion Kip Lines 9+11-12 612.7 1,076 775 
11 Imports 1000US$ COMTRADE data 1,298 48,328 58,297 
12 Exports 1000US$ COMTRADE data 224 5 16 
13 Imports Billion Kip Line 11xLine 49 12 441 531 
14 Exports Billion Kip Line 12xLine 49 2 0 0 
15            
16 
2.
 D
O
M
ES
TI
C
 
VA
R
IA
B
LE
S 
Wholesale price for tradable inputs 
(Pw) 
Unit na na na na 
17 Wholesale price for processed goods (Pwp) 
1000Kip/MT MOIC Internal Trade Dept  764.6 10,195 
18 Tax on primary good production (sf < 0 if a subsidy) proportion Turnover tax or VAT 10% 10% 10% 
19 Tax on processed good production (sp 
< 0 if a subsidy) 
proportion Turnover tax or VAT 10% 10% 10% 
20 Consumer tax on processed products (ccp < 0 if a subsidy) proportion Consumer tax 0% 0% 0% 
21            
22 
3.
 IN
TE
R
N
A
TI
O
N
A
L 
VA
R
IA
B
LE
S 
Processed products:      
23 cif import price (Pmp) Beer: US$/100liter; 
cement & 
steel: US$/MT 
Customs Dept 160.3 65.9 796.2 
24 fob export price (Pxp) Customs Dept na 56.0 676.7 
25 International reference price (Pp)      
26 International trading cost for imports (Tmp) 
proportion Steel: www.steelonthenet.com  16% 15% 
27 International trading cost for exports (Txp) 
proportion 
Cement: 
http://www.bnamericas.com/news/infrastructure/Hefty_C
ement_Costs_Problem_for_Constructors  
16% 15% 
28   Beer:    
29 Quality adjustment:      
30 Primary good - Quality adjustment for imports (qm) 
proportion 
Industry surveys (superior = negative) 
1.0 1.0 1.0 
31 Processed goods - Quality adjustment for imports (qmp) 
proportion 0.9 1.1 1.2 
32 Processed goods - Quality adjustment for exports (qxp) 
proportion 0.9 1.1 1.2 
33 Trade subsidies and taxes      
34 Primary good - Import tariff (tm<0 if a subsidy) proportion Input-weighted average from ERP Tables  
5.6% 5.0% 
35 Primary good - Export subsidy (sx<0 if a tax) proportion 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
36 Processed goods - Import tariff (tmp<0 if a subsidy) proportion Customs Dept 40.0% 5.0% 5.0% 
37 Processed goods - Excise tax  proportion Customs Dept 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
IMPLICATIONS OF WTO ACCESSION FOR SELECTED DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES OF LAOS    
 
41 
1 DERIVATION OF AD VALOREM TARIFF EQUIVALENTS OF NTBS Unit Source / Formula Beer Cement 
Steel 
Bars 
38 Processed goods - Import tariff + Excise tax proportion Customs Dept 110.0% 5.0% 5.0% 
39 Processed goods - Export subsidy (sxp<0 if a tax) 
proportion Customs Dept 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
40 Exchange rate      
41 Official exchange rate kip/US$ Average 2007/08 fiscal year 9,115 9,115 9,115 
42 Proportion of foreign currency sold on the parallel market proportion  0% 0% 0% 
43 Parallel market rate (leave "n.a." if no parallel market exists) kip/US$  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
44 Discounted parallel market rate kip/US$  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
45 Primary good - Relevant exchange rate for imports (Em) 
kip/US$  9,115 9,115 9,115 
46 Primary good - Relevant exchange rate for exports (Ex) 
kip/US$  9,115 9,115 9,115 
47 Processed goods - Relevant exchange rate for imports (Emp) 
kip/US$  9,115 9,115 9,115 
48 Processed goods - Relevant exchange rate for exports (Exp) 
kip/US$  9,115 9,115 9,115 
49 Equilibrium exchange rate which would prevail in undistorted mkt (E) kip/US$  9,115 9,115 9,115 
50            
51 
4.
 P
R
IC
E 
M
A
R
G
IN
S 
Wholesale price for processed goods 
(Pwp)  
1000Kip/100lit
er or MT Line 17  765 10,195 
52 
Retail markup on processed 
wholesale prices (net of consumption 
tax) 
proportion Line 53/51  5.6% 5.0% 
53 Retail price for processed goods(Prp) (including consumption tax) 1000Kip/MT 
Cement: Lao industry data; steel: 
www.steelonthenet.com  807 10,705 
54            
55 
5.
PR
IM
A
R
Y 
PR
O
D
U
C
T 
% of production exported in primary 
form % Industry surveys 0% 0% 0% 
56 % of primary production that is processed % Industry surveys 100% 100% 100% 
57 % of primary production for final use % Industry surveys 100% 100% 100% 
58 % of domestic utilization imported % Line 11/10  na na 
59            
60 
6.
 O
U
TP
U
T % processed output exported % Line 14/8 1.5% 0.0% 0.6% 
61 % of consumption imported % Line 11/10  41% 69% 
62 % self-sufficiency overall % Line 9/(10+13-12)  42% 19% 
63            
64 
7 
U
N
D
IS
TO
R
TE
D
 
IN
TE
R
N
A
TI
O
N
A
L 
PR
IC
ES
 Undistorted international price - 
processed products (Pip)      
65 Importable Beer: kip/liter; cement & 
steel: 
1000kip/MT 
Customs Dept 13,150 660 8,708 
66 Exportable COMTRADE data X exch rate 2008 14,611 600 7,257 
67            
68 
8.
 N
O
M
IN
A
L 
R
A
TE
 O
F 
A
SS
IS
TA
N
C
E NRAp: Processed goods  Lines:    
69 Importable proportion (1+19)*51/65-1  27.3% 28.8% 
70 Exportable proportion (1+19)*51/66-1  40.1% 54.5% 
71            
72 
9.
 C
O
N
SU
M
ER
 
TA
X 
EQ
U
IV
A
LE
N
T CTEcp: Consumers, processed 
goods  Lines:    
73 Importable proportion (1+20)*51/65-1  15.8% 17.1% 
74 Exportable proportion (1+20)*51/66-1  27.3% 40.5% 
75            
76 
10
.N
TB
s Tariff equivalent of NTBs on importable processed products, NTBm 
proportion (69+1)((1+19)/(1+(47-49)/49))-1-38  10.8% 12.1% 
77 
Tariff equivalent of NTBs on 
exportable processed products, NTBx 
(NTBm <0, subsidy on exports) 
proportion 1+39-((70+1)/((1+19)*(1-(49-48)/49)))  -27.3% -40.5% 
78            
79 
11
. %
 
O
F 
N
R
A
 % proportion of NRAp:      
80 Importable processed products:  Lines:  100% 100% 
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1 DERIVATION OF AD VALOREM TARIFF EQUIVALENTS OF NTBS Unit Source / Formula Beer Cement 
Steel 
Bars 
81 Exchange rate distortions (if importable) % ((47-49)/49)/(((47-49)/49)+19+76+38)  0% 0% 
82 Import tariffs (if importable) % 38/(((45-47)/47)+19+74+38)  32% 29% 
84 NTBs (if importable) % 74/(((45-47)/47)+19+74+38)  68% 71% 
85 Exportable processed products:    100% 100% 
86 Exchange rate distortions (if exportable) % (-(49-48)/49)/(-((49-48)/49)+19-77+39)  0% 0% 
87 Export subsidies (if exportable) % 39/(-((49-48)/49)+19-77+39)  0% 0% 
89 NTBs (if exportable) % -75/(-((47-46)/47)+19-75+39)  100% 100% 
             
 Source: calculations by author based on methodology adopted from Kym Anderson and Will Martin, "Distortions to 
Agricultural Incentives in Asia". Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2009. 
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ANNEX B: Practitioners Guide to Calculating the 
Effective Rate of Protection for Selected Industries 
 
A widely advocated reason for imposing a tariff is to protect domestic industries from 
foreign competition, especially for their strategic industries like cement or steel, or for 
infant industries to be protected during the formative period. The rate of protection is the 
increase in the price of an imported commodity and the import-substitute (an equivalent 
product made by a local manufacturer) in proportion to its border price. The price increase 
is the amount of market protection provided to domestic producers.  When there is no 
other trade barrier, it simply equals the tariff rate. The effective rate of protection (ERP) is 
the proportional increase in the domestic so-called value-added, and it is therefore the 
portion of the price that is added to the value of the domestically produced good. Then the 
ERP is the relative increase in value-added in a tariff-protected industry over the value-
added of that product under free trade, as measured by the border prices.  
The ERP can be defined for a product j as the percentage excess of domestic value 
added, V over the international market value added, W, i.e., that which would have been 
realized in the absence of the existing tariff structure: 
ERPj  =  (Vj - Wj) / Wj  …(B.1) 
The main determinant of the ERP level is the relationship between the nominal rates of 
protection of outputs and inputs, although the share of tradable inputs in any selected 
activity, or the technical coefficient, also influences the level of the ERP.  In practice, the 
ERP can be calculated either through detailed information concerning the activities at the 
firm level, as was done in the present study, or through the data supplied by input-output 
tables. Either way, the data is used to calculate the ERP in the following manner: 
Let Wj  = Pj(1 - Σiaij) and Vj  =  Pj[(1+tj) - Σiaij(1+ti)], where aij is the technical coefficient of 
input in activity j, i.e., the value of input  i  per unit value of output in activity  j; tj  is the 
nominal rate of protection of production of  j; and ti is the nominal rate of protection of input  
i. Then from equation (B.1) we can express the level of effective protection as follows: 
ERPj   =  {Pj[(1+tj) - Σiaij(1+ti)] / Pj(1 - Σiaij)} – 1 …(B.2) 
Rearranging terms yields the formula used to estimate the level of effective protection: 
 ERPj  = (tj - Σiaijti) / (1 - Σiaij)  
   = (1 - Σi ai)/{[1/(1+t)] – Σi [ai/(1+ti)]} – 1 …(B.3) 
The results of the calculations are shown in Table B.1 for cement and B.2 for steel bars. 
The first line of the tables gives the domestic price and the border price of the net total 
product for each industry. The value product equals net output plus subsidies less taxes 
on each product. Afterwards, the cost of intermediate material inputs, services, fuel, 
power, and other overhead costs. The data on production costs of the cement industry are 
from one of the large domestic producers and have been applied to total cement 
production of Laos in 2008 reported by the Department of Statistics of the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment. The data on production costs of the steel bar industry is also 
based on production costs reported by one of the large steel bar producers in the country, 
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but additional production cost information has been obtain from international sources for a 
typical steel producer.68  
 
 
                                            
68 The data source is http://www.steelonthenet.com/prices.html.  
Table B.1: Calculation of Effective Rate of Protection for Cement Industry 
Coef. 
(ai) aiti ai-prime ai prime/(1+ti)
Products, Subsidies and Taxes
Total Product             621,842             592,230 5.0% 2523
Finished products 690,935            
Taxes: VAT 10%               69,094 
Tradable Material Input 117,586            111,986            0.189 
Coal 48,560              46,248              5.0% 0.078 0.004 0.078    0.074            2505
Limestone 27,158              25,865              5.0% 0.044 0.002 0.044    0.042            2521
Diesel 20,308              19,341              5.0% 0.033 0.002 0.033    0.031            271019
Gypsum 12,500              11,905              5.0% 0.020 0.001 0.020    0.019            2520
Crushed limestone 5,120                4,876                5.0% 0.008 0.000 0.008    0.008            2521
Clay sand 2,131                2,029                5.0% 0.003 0.000 0.003    0.003            2508
Sillica clay 1,071                1,020                5.0% 0.002 0.000 0.002    0.002            2508
Iron clay 737                   702                   5.0% 0.001 0.000 0.001    0.001            2508
Other Tradable Inputs 71,916              64,090              0.108 
Cement bag 25,852              21,544              20.0% 0.036 0.007 0.042    0.035            39231090
Spare parts 21,778              19,798              10.0% 0.033 0.003 0.035    0.032            8409
Refractory 9,592                9,135                5.0% 0.015 0.001 0.015    0.015            6901
Lubricant 8,792                7,992                10.0% 0.013 0.001 0.014    0.013            3403
Grinding media 5,079                4,837                5.0% 0.008 0.000 0.008    0.008            6804
Other materials 823                   784                   5.0% 0.001 0.000 0.001    0.001            na
Non-Tradable Inputs 246,637            246,637            
Electricity 62,857              62,857              0.106 -     0.101    0.101            
Overhead 13,520              13,520              0.023 -     0.022    0.022            
Depreciation 170,260            170,260            0.287 -     0.274    0.274            
Total Non-Factor Cost 436,139            422,714            0.822 0.023 0.701    0.680            
9.5%
CHECKS:
Value Added Vd 43,872              
Value Added Vw 40,048              
Vd/Vw-1 9.5%
(Vd-Vw)/Vw 9.5%
[t-sum(ati)]/[1-sum(a)] 9.5%
Border Price 
Based
HS codes
Domestic Price 
BasedCEMENT
 2008 Domestic 
Price 
Equivalent 
(mil. Kip) 
2008 Border 
Price 
Equivalent 
(mil. Kip)
Tariff 
Rate 
(t)
ERP = [t-sum(ati)]/[1-sum(a)] 
 
Note: the domestic price equivalent of the finished product is calculated as the wholesale price in Vientiane City 
multiplied by the number of tons produced (reported total profit divided by profit per ton). 
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Table B.2: Calculation of Effective Rate of Protection for Steel Bar Industry 
Coef. 
(ai) aiti ai-prime ai prime/(1+ti)
Products, Subsidies and Taxes
Total Product           161,742           154,040 5.0% 7213
Finished products           179,713           169,444 
Taxes: VAT 10%             17,971 
Tradable Material Inputs 64,402           61,335           0.398    
Iron ore & scrap 22,386.6                 21,320.6 5.0% 0.138    0.007       0.138       0.132             260111
Coking coal 34,787.5                 33,130.9 5.0% 0.215    0.011       0.215       0.205             270112
Steel scrap 5,342.9                     5,088.4 5.0% 0.033    0.002       0.033       0.031             720449
Oxygen 1,884.7                     1,794.9 5.0% 0.012    0.001       0.012       0.011             2520
Other Tradable Inputs 22,173           21,117           0.137    
Ferroalloys 6,058.8                     5,770.3 5.0% 0.037    0.002       0.037       0.036             2521
Fluxes 4,068.5                     3,874.7 5.0% 0.025    0.001       0.025       0.024             
Refractory 1,675.3                     1,595.5 5.0% 0.010    0.001       0.010       0.010             6901
Other materials 10,370.6                   9,876.8 5.0% 0.064    0.003       0.064       0.061             na
Non-Tradable Inputs 16,525           16,525           
Electricity 1,966.4                     1,966.4 0.013    -          0.012       0.012             
Overhead 3,988.7                     3,988.7 0.026    -          0.025       0.025             
Depreciation 10,570.1                 10,570.1 0.069    -          0.065       0.065             
Total Non-Factor Cost 103,100         98,977           0.780    0.027       0.637       0.612             
6.5%
CHECKS:
Value Added Vd 58,642           
Value Added Vw 55,062           
Vd/Vw-1 6.5%
(Vd-Vw)/Vw 6.5%
[t-sum(ati)]/[1-sum(a)] 6.5%
HS codes
ERP = [t-sum(ati)]/[1-sum(a)] 
STEEL BARS
 Domestic 
Price 
Equivalent 
(mil. Kip) 
Border Price 
Equivalent 
(mil. Kip)
Tariff 
Rate 
(t)
Border Price 
Based Domestic Price Based
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ANNEX C: Trade Statistics 
 
 
Beer (HS2203) - Value in US dollars 
 
Beer (HS2203) - Volume in Liters 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
1988   11,627   
 
1988   18,218 -18,218 
1989   83,949   
 
1989   146,554 -146,554 
1990   11,962   
 
1990   15,375 -15,375 
1991   17,808   
 
1991   27,964 -27,964 
1992   137,609   
 
1992   149,311 -149,311 
1993   845,124   
 
1993   762,807 -762,807 
1994   1,474,112   
 
1994   1,221,499 -1,221,499 
1995   2,080,072   
 
1995   1,802,242 -1,802,242 
1996 4,764 1,133,086 -1,128,322 
 
1996 4,562 951,437 -946,875 
1997 9,606 830,897 -821,291 
 
1997 9,000 681,804 -672,804 
1998 29,687 104,247 -74,560 
 
1998 35,250 125,280 -90,030 
1999 40,670 405,718 -365,048 
 
1999 52,842 340,077 -287,235 
2000 198,445 501,527 -303,082 
 
2000 226,001 444,985 -218,984 
2001 54,625 512,579 -457,954 
 
2001 66,512 448,371 -381,859 
2002 50,594 421,971 -371,377 
 
2002 47,321 352,219 -304,898 
2003 95,741 543,968 -448,227 
 
2003 114,214 405,908 -291,694 
2004 194,804 470,791 -275,987 
 
2004 195,446 343,057 -147,611 
2005 186,856 1,048,820 -861,964 
 
2005 202,422 1,063,186 -860,764 
2006 270,556 2,084,808 -1,814,252 
 
2006 348,553 2,021,187 -1,672,634 
2007 395,161 1,359,928 -964,767 
 
2007 419,528 1,209,264 -789,736 
2008 223,590 1,297,642 -1,074,052 
 
2008 289,460 1,188,281 -898,821 
 
Table Note 
The following data is based on so-called ‘mirror trade data, which uses partner country data 
to determine the volume and value of Lao PDR’s imports and exports of beer, cement and 
steel bars.  
Source of data: United Nations, COMTRADE database. Available: http://comtrade.un.org/ 
The following HS2002 lines are represented in the following tables: 
BEER: 
2203 – Beer made from malt 
 
CEMENT: 
2523 – Portland cement, aluminous cement, slag cement etc 
3214 – Glaziers putty, resin cements, caulking comps etc 
3816  – Refractory cements, mortars, concretes, etc. nesoi 
6810 – Articles of cement, concrete or artificial stone 
6811  - Articles of asbestos-cement, cell fib cement etc 
 
STEEL BAR 
7213 – Bars & rods, iron & na steel, h-r irreg coils 
7214 – Bars & rods, iron & na steel nesoi, h-r etc 
7215 – Bars & rods, iron & na steel nesoi 
7221 – Bars and rods, stainless steel, hot-rolled, irreg coils 
7222 – Bars & rods, st steel nesoi, angles etc, st steel 
7227 – Bars & rods alloy steel nesoi, hot-rolled irreg coils 
7228 – Alloy steel nesoi bars, angles etc, hol dr st bars etc 
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Cement TOTAL - Value in US dollars 
 
Cement TOTAL - Volume in Kg 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
1988 0 29,271 -29,271 
 
1988 0 47,000 -47,000 
1989 0 2,590,691 -2,590,691 
 
1989 0 37,098,753 -37,098,753 
1990 0 1,522,740 -1,522,740 
 
1990 0 18,433,742 -18,433,742 
1991 0 1,280,757 -1,280,757 
 
1991 0 10,746,653 -10,746,653 
1992 0 3,846,890 -3,846,890 
 
1992 0 46,007,442 -46,007,442 
1993 0 9,368,181 -9,368,181 
 
1993 0 139,911,291 -139,911,291 
1994 0 11,633,090 -11,633,090 
 
1994 0 188,730,562 -188,730,562 
1995 0 18,896,528 -18,896,528 
 
1995 0 264,119,481 -264,119,481 
1996 0 18,234,571 -18,234,571 
 
1996 0 259,264,256 -259,264,256 
1997 5,073 16,324,853 -16,319,780 
 
1997 21,249 294,740,094 -294,718,845 
1998 0 16,599,639 -16,599,639 
 
1998 0 334,888,507 -334,888,507 
1999 50,834 16,727,399 -16,676,565 
 
1999 142,789 313,389,197 -313,246,408 
2000 0 19,100,462 -19,100,462 
 
2000 0 308,932,887 -308,932,887 
2001 3,714 19,052,394 -19,048,680 
 
2001 10,800 448,273,814 -448,263,014 
2002 0 14,766,391 -14,766,391 
 
2002 0 330,919,942 -330,919,942 
2003 0 15,217,212 -15,217,212 
 
2003 0 288,637,107 -288,637,107 
2004 0 20,351,065 -20,351,065 
 
2004 0 323,438,536 -323,438,536 
2005 86,000 19,606,248 -19,520,248 
 
2005 211,200 1,477,837,011 -1,477,625,811 
2006 24 37,713,986 -37,713,962 
 
2006 400 643,209,957 -643,209,557 
2007 3,600 43,091,137 -43,087,537 
 
2007 90,000 753,831,967 -753,741,967 
2008 4,874 48,328,073 -48,323,199 
 
2008 59,725 577,806,854 -577,747,129 
 
Portland Cement (HS2523) –  
Value in US dollars 
 
Portland Cement (HS2523) - Volume in Kg 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
1988       
 
1988     0 
1989   2,189,611 -2,189,611 
 
1989   33,943,241 -33,943,241 
1990   1,011,533 -1,011,533 
 
1990   15,780,210 -15,780,210 
1991   437,775 -437,775 
 
1991   6,203,312 -6,203,312 
1992   2,739,547 -2,739,547 
 
1992   40,737,785 -40,737,785 
1993   7,794,820 -7,794,820 
 
1993   131,462,850 -131,462,850 
1994   9,290,224 -9,290,224 
 
1994   174,004,874 -174,004,874 
1995   14,474,724 -14,474,724 
 
1995   240,900,560 -240,900,560 
1996   13,782,604 -13,782,604 
 
1996   236,536,048 -236,536,048 
1997 2,292 13,692,667 -13,690,375 
 
1997 11,437 275,858,534 -275,847,097 
1998   11,399,613 -11,399,613 
 
1998   293,007,226 -293,007,226 
1999   11,901,183 -11,901,183 
 
1999   276,411,893 -276,411,893 
2000   14,267,652 -14,267,652 
 
2000   269,831,930 -269,831,930 
2001   13,889,024 -13,889,024 
 
2001   403,765,950 -403,765,950 
2002   9,666,298 -9,666,298 
 
2002   288,469,543 -288,469,543 
2003   9,492,901 -9,492,901 
 
2003   236,659,613 -236,659,613 
2004   10,713,070 -10,713,070 
 
2004   277,093,599 -277,093,599 
2005   11,606,668 -11,606,668 
 
2005   1,421,905,373 -1,421,905,373 
2006 24 25,527,615 -25,527,591 
 
2006 400 565,453,907 -565,453,507 
2007 3,600 27,845,607 -27,842,007 
 
2007 90,000 664,909,414 -664,819,414 
2008 4,874 30,010,628 -30,005,754 
 
2008 59,725 477,532,137 -477,472,412 
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Refractory Cement (HS3816) –  
Value in US dollars 
 
Refractory Cement (HS3816) - Volume in Kg 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
1988       
 
1988     0 
1989   19,547 -19,547 
 
1989   11,875 -11,875 
1990     0 
 
1990     0 
1991     0 
 
1991     0 
1992   612 -612 
 
1992   2,000 -2,000 
1993     0 
 
1993     0 
1994   17,362 -17,362 
 
1994   8,750 -8,750 
1995   14,538 -14,538 
 
1995   8,625 -8,625 
1996   1,384 -1,384 
 
1996   1,187 -1,187 
1997   1,913 -1,913 
 
1997   5,375 -5,375 
1998   3,879 -3,879 
 
1998   4,062 -4,062 
1999   9,409 -9,409 
 
1999   30,812 -30,812 
2000   336 -336 
 
2000   440 -440 
2001   27,461 -27,461 
 
2001   106,031 -106,031 
2002   19,766 -19,766 
 
2002   77,100 -77,100 
2003   7,373 -7,373 
 
2003   32,715 -32,715 
2004   84,834 -84,834 
 
2004   166,994 -166,994 
2005   20,423 -20,423 
 
2005   60,056 -60,056 
2006   808,094 -808,094 
 
2006   2,561,846 -2,561,846 
2007   573,124 -573,124 
 
2007   3,293,526 -3,293,526 
2008   578,733 -578,733 
 
2008   1,278,275 -1,278,275 
 
Cement Articles (HS6810) –  
Value in US dollars 
 
Cement Articles (HS6810) 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
1988       
 
1988     0 
1989   171,108 -171,108 
 
1989   2,171,518 -2,171,518 
1990   48,188 -48,188 
 
1990   638,233 -638,233 
1991   38,597 -38,597 
 
1991   666,448 -666,448 
1992   51,111 -51,111 
 
1992   528,432 -528,432 
1993   159,332 -159,332 
 
1993   2,123,310 -2,123,310 
1994   391,466 -391,466 
 
1994   6,225,592 -6,225,592 
1995   278,159 -278,159 
 
1995   5,535,103 -5,535,103 
1996   1,182,758 -1,182,758 
 
1996   8,634,561 -8,634,561 
1997   622,444 -622,444 
 
1997   8,605,159 -8,605,159 
1998   498,104 -498,104 
 
1998   10,071,229 -10,071,229 
1999   540,527 -540,527 
 
1999   9,501,424 -9,501,424 
2000   643,885 -643,885 
 
2000   9,775,620 -9,775,620 
2001 3,714 702,620 -698,906 
 
2001 10,800 11,501,759 -11,490,959 
2002   601,468 -601,468 
 
2002   8,992,664 -8,992,664 
2003   929,311 -929,311 
 
2003   15,777,079 -15,777,079 
2004   3,759,444 -3,759,444 
 
2004   10,858,394 -10,858,394 
2005 86,000 1,206,007 -1,120,007 
 
2005 211,200 12,293,834 -12,082,634 
2006   1,450,187 -1,450,187 
 
2006   16,015,945 -16,015,945 
2007   3,603,421 -3,603,421 
 
2007   32,147,523 -32,147,523 
2008   2,960,257 -2,960,257 
 
2008   25,942,385 -25,942,385 
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Asbestos Cement (HS6811) –  
Value in US dollars 
 
Asbestos Cement (HS6811) 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
1988   29,271 -29,271 
 
1988   47,000 -47,000 
1989   210,425 -210,425 
 
1989   972,119 -972,119 
1990   463,019 -463,019 
 
1990   2,015,299 -2,015,299 
1991   804,385 -804,385 
 
1991   3,876,893 -3,876,893 
1992   1,055,620 -1,055,620 
 
1992   4,739,225 -4,739,225 
1993   1,414,029 -1,414,029 
 
1993   6,325,131 -6,325,131 
1994   1,934,038 -1,934,038 
 
1994   8,491,346 -8,491,346 
1995   4,129,107 -4,129,107 
 
1995   17,675,193 -17,675,193 
1996   3,267,825 -3,267,825 
 
1996   14,092,460 -14,092,460 
1997 2,781 2,007,829 -2,005,048 
 
1997 9,812 10,271,026 -10,261,214 
1998   4,698,043 -4,698,043 
 
1998   31,805,990 -31,805,990 
1999 50,834 4,276,280 -4,225,446 
 
1999 142,789 27,445,068 -27,302,279 
2000   4,188,589 -4,188,589 
 
2000   29,324,897 -29,324,897 
2001   4,433,289 -4,433,289 
 
2001   32,900,074 -32,900,074 
2002   4,478,859 -4,478,859 
 
2002   33,380,635 -33,380,635 
2003   4,787,627 -4,787,627 
 
2003   36,167,700 -36,167,700 
2004   5,793,717 -5,793,717 
 
2004   35,319,549 -35,319,549 
2005   6,773,150 -6,773,150 
 
2005   43,577,748 -43,577,748 
2006   9,928,090 -9,928,090 
 
2006   59,178,259 -59,178,259 
2007   11,068,985 -11,068,985 
 
2007   53,481,504 -53,481,504 
2008   14,778,455 -14,778,455 
 
2008   73,054,057 -73,054,057 
 
Steel Bars TOTAL - Value in US dollars 
 
Steel Bars TOTAL - Volume in Kg 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
1988 50,860 42,426 8,434 
 
1988 100,000 55,000 45,000 
1989 437,819 499,630 -61,811 
 
1989 1,467,125 527,034 940,091 
1990 167,640 900,756 -733,116 
 
1990 566,191 2,444,401 -1,878,210 
1991 0 1,059,268 -1,059,268 
 
1991 0 2,373,494 -2,373,494 
1992 0 577,767 -577,767 
 
1992 0 2,011,371 -2,011,371 
1993 0 1,356,478 -1,356,478 
 
1993 0 3,411,929 -3,411,929 
1994 132,000 4,614,728 -4,482,728 
 
1994 400,000 10,429,424 -10,029,424 
1995 361,037 7,343,618 -6,982,581 
 
1995 1,214,757 16,711,139 -15,496,382 
1996 0 6,333,859 -6,333,859 
 
1996 0 102,397,328 -102,397,328 
1997 44,710 6,251,488 -6,206,778 
 
1997 124,913 18,950,769 -18,825,856 
1998 25,849 7,900,126 -7,874,277 
 
1998 50,687 27,882,955 -27,832,268 
1999 0 4,465,416 -4,465,416 
 
1999 142,789 17,439,799 -17,297,010 
2000 0 8,331,059 -8,331,059 
 
2000 0 29,750,408 -29,750,408 
2001 96,525 6,596,032 -6,499,507 
 
2001 96,525 25,656,259 -25,559,734 
2002 0 10,467,848 -10,467,848 
 
2002 0 38,998,241 -38,998,241 
2003 18,618 11,630,675 -11,612,057 
 
2003 30,000 36,103,085 -36,073,085 
2004 2,858 13,460,626 -13,457,768 
 
2004 193 28,218,323 -28,218,130 
2005 746 14,112,908 -14,112,162 
 
2005 182 30,474,947 -30,474,765 
2006 0 22,600,217 -22,600,217 
 
2006 0 44,237,817 -44,237,817 
2007 20,400 46,083,866 -46,063,466 
 
2007 20,400 75,175,095 -75,154,695 
2008 16,459 58,296,575 -58,280,116 
 
2008 26,152 110,421,343 -110,395,191 
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Steel Bars (HS 7213) –  
Value in US dollars 
 
Steel Bars (HS 7213) - Volume in Kg 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
1988 20,860 20,860 0 
 
1988 70,000   70,000 
1989 216,344 328,766 -112,422 
 
1989 719,125 206,080 513,045 
1990   22,102 -22,102 
 
1990   50,561 -50,561 
1991   232,077 -232,077 
 
1991   430,562 -430,562 
1992   258,522 -258,522 
 
1992   526,246 -526,246 
1993   180,796 -180,796 
 
1993   387,568 -387,568 
1994 132,000 347,977 -215,977 
 
1994 400,000 651,431 -251,431 
1995 288,737 489,112 -200,375 
 
1995 1,008,187 495,548 512,639 
1996   1,186,750 -1,186,750 
 
1996   3,047,036 -3,047,036 
1997   452,566 -452,566 
 
1997   1,337,856 -1,337,856 
1998 25,849 1,904,495 -1,878,646 
 
1998 50,687 7,230,623 -7,179,936 
1999   333,489 -333,489 
 
1999   1,005,193 -1,005,193 
2000   2,784,656 -2,784,656 
 
2000   9,415,172 -9,415,172 
2001   1,317,157 -1,317,157 
 
2001   5,578,821 -5,578,821 
2002   2,406,097 -2,406,097 
 
2002   9,806,247 -9,806,247 
2003   1,909,338 -1,909,338 
 
2003   5,818,088 -5,818,088 
2004   2,340,968 -2,340,968 
 
2004   4,687,419 -4,687,419 
2005   3,153,359 -3,153,359 
 
2005   6,614,229 -6,614,229 
2006   6,195,191 -6,195,191 
 
2006   12,627,631 -12,627,631 
2007   8,565,789 -8,565,789 
 
2007   15,472,523 -15,472,523 
2008   3,542,912 -3,542,912 
 
2008   4,315,261 -4,315,261 
 
Steel Bars (HS 7214) - Value in US dollars 
 
Steel Bars (HS 7214) - Volume in Kg 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
1988   21,566 -21,566 
 
1988   55,000 -55,000 
1989 221,475 19,426 202,049 
 
1989 748,000 51,214 696,786 
1990 167,640 765,954 -598,314 
 
1990 566,191 2,177,787 -1,611,596 
1991   168,848 -168,848 
 
1991   529,089 -529,089 
1992   147,208 -147,208 
 
1992   397,628 -397,628 
1993   404,584 -404,584 
 
1993   1,067,624 -1,067,624 
1994   1,499,568 -1,499,568 
 
1994   3,271,326 -3,271,326 
1995 72,300 3,272,465 -3,200,165 
 
1995 206,570 8,628,713 -8,422,143 
1996   2,083,050 -2,083,050 
 
1996   91,548,707 -91,548,707 
1997 44,710 2,648,537 -2,603,827 
 
1997 115,101 7,918,193 -7,803,092 
1998   4,086,994 -4,086,994 
 
1998   13,533,045 -13,533,045 
1999   1,937,832 -1,937,832 
 
1999   7,385,337 -7,385,337 
2000   4,191,142 -4,191,142 
 
2000   15,298,627 -15,298,627 
2001   3,630,715 -3,630,715 
 
2001   14,056,686 -14,056,686 
2002   4,115,936 -4,115,936 
 
2002   14,020,203 -14,020,203 
2003 14,094 4,049,908 -4,035,814 
 
2003 30,000 12,054,378 -12,024,378 
2004 2,858 6,852,221 -6,849,363 
 
2004 193 14,309,682 -14,309,489 
2005   5,638,707 -5,638,707 
 
2005   12,071,482 -12,071,482 
2006   6,371,281 -6,371,281 
 
2006   12,344,403 -12,344,403 
2007   18,750,843 -18,750,843 
 
2007   29,207,712 -29,207,712 
2008 5,028 33,546,929 -33,541,901 
 
2008 7,547 42,136,183 -42,128,636 
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Steel Bars (HS 7215) - Value in US dollars 
 
Steel Bars (HS 7215) - Volume in Kg 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
1988 30,000   -70,618 
 
1988 30,000   -162,213 
1989   100,618 -110,302 
 
1989   192,213 -211,866 
1990   110,302 -654,391 
 
1990   211,866 -1,413,187 
1991   654,391 -161,496 
 
1991   1,413,187 -1,055,776 
1992   161,496 -561,158 
 
1992   1,055,776 -1,364,717 
1993   561,158 -1,662,294 
 
1993   1,364,717 -3,803,600 
1994   1,662,294 -1,716,861 
 
1994   3,803,600 -3,808,425 
1995   1,716,861 -1,995,347 
 
1995   3,808,425 -5,200,386 
1996   1,995,347 -2,113,904 
 
1996   5,200,386 -6,853,284 
1997   2,113,904 -828,169 
 
1997   6,853,284 -3,078,065 
1998   828,169 -173,790 
 
1998   3,078,065 -532,061 
1999   173,790 -637,018 
 
1999   532,061 -2,273,376 
2000   637,018 -974,084 
 
2000   2,273,376 -3,528,085 
2001 96,525 974,084 -607,226 
 
2001 96,525 3,528,085 -2,343,047 
2002   703,751 -589,451 
 
2002   2,439,572 -1,798,189 
2003   589,451 -432,707 
 
2003   1,798,189 -828,143 
2004   432,707 -2,153,581 
 
2004   828,143 -4,457,379 
2005   2,153,581 -8,448,557 
 
2005   4,457,379 -15,909,247 
2006   8,448,557 -13,947,749 
 
2006   15,909,247 -22,795,933 
2007 20,400 13,947,749 -14,245,200 
 
2007 20,400 22,795,933 -56,170,326 
2008   14,265,600 -14,265,600 
 
2008   56,190,726 -56,190,726 
 
Steel Bars (HS 7221) –  
Value in US dollars 
 
Steel Bars (HS 7221) - Volume in Kg 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
1988     0 
 
1988     0 
1989     0 
 
1989     0 
1990     0 
 
1990     0 
1991     0 
 
1991     0 
1992     0 
 
1992     0 
1993   3,091 -3,091 
 
1993   14,000 -14,000 
1994   4,453 -4,453 
 
1994   8,687 -8,687 
1995   33,546 -33,546 
 
1995   68,460 -68,460 
1996     0 
 
1996     0 
1997   118,708 -118,708 
 
1997   307,937 -307,937 
1998     0 
 
1998     0 
1999     0 
 
1999     0 
2000   8,016 -8,016 
 
2000     0 
2001     0 
 
2001     0 
2002     0 
 
2002     0 
2003   933 -933 
 
2003     0 
2004     0 
 
2004     0 
2005     0 
 
2005     0 
2006     0 
 
2006     0 
2007   42,004 -42,004 
 
2007     0 
2008   21,084 -21,084 
 
2008     0 
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Steel Bars (HS 7222) –  
Value in US dollars 
 
Steel Bars (HS 7222) - Volume in Kg 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
1988     0 
 
1988     0 
1989   17,946 -17,946 
 
1989   24,257 -24,257 
1990   751 -751 
 
1990   1,437 -1,437 
1991     0 
 
1991     0 
1992     0 
 
1992     0 
1993   33,617 -33,617 
 
1993   87,108 -87,108 
1994   399,222 -399,222 
 
1994   882,596 -882,596 
1995   906,413 -906,413 
 
1995   1,745,198 -1,745,198 
1996   112,140 -112,140 
 
1996   225,061 -225,061 
1997   183,041 -183,041 
 
1997   523,818 -523,818 
1998   9,800 -9,800 
 
1998   16,529 -16,529 
1999   17,385 -17,385 
 
1999   40,226 -40,226 
2000   100,630 -100,630 
 
2000   257,556 -257,556 
2001   43,881 -43,881 
 
2001   132,685 -132,685 
2002   101,611 -101,611 
 
2002   192,377 -192,377 
2003   107,884 -107,884 
 
2003   311,614 -311,614 
2004   207,461 -207,461 
 
2004   1,169,839 -1,169,839 
2005 746 190,756 -190,010 
 
2005 182 269,623 -269,441 
2006   445,277 -445,277 
 
2006   850,307 -850,307 
2007   947,484 -947,484 
 
2007   1,000,177 -1,000,177 
2008 11,431 1,875,838 -1,864,407 
 
2008 18,605 1,946,240 -1,927,635 
 
Steel Bars (HS 7227) –  
Value in US dollars 
 
Steel Bars (HS 7227) - Volume in Kg 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
1988       
 
1988     0 
1989       
 
1989     0 
1990       
 
1990     0 
1991       
 
1991     0 
1992   4,762 -4,762 
 
1992   23,750 -23,750 
1993   123,407 -123,407 
 
1993   333,828 -333,828 
1994   381,888 -381,888 
 
1994   852,125 -852,125 
1995   212,204 -212,204 
 
1995   505,375 -505,375 
1996   60,584 -60,584 
 
1996   150,957 -150,957 
1997   112,716 -112,716 
 
1997   339,000 -339,000 
1998   17,232 -17,232 
 
1998   41,566 -41,566 
1999   71,187 -71,187 
 
1999   245,601 -245,601 
2000   10,520 -10,520 
 
2000   23,233 -23,233 
2001   1,088 -1,088 
 
2001   525 -525 
2002   2,935 -2,935 
 
2002   9,923 -9,923 
2003   520,271 -520,271 
 
2003   1,438,359 -1,438,359 
2004   1,347,970 -1,347,970 
 
2004   2,511,304 -2,511,304 
2005   32,432 -32,432 
 
2005   65,914 -65,914 
2006   41,637 -41,637 
 
2006   80,178 -80,178 
2007   360,441 -360,441 
 
2007   595,142 -595,142 
2008   551,826 -551,826 
 
2008   682,031 -682,031 
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Steel Bars (HS 7228) –  
Value in US dollars 
 
Steel Bars (HS 7228) - Volume in Kg 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
 
  Exports Imports X - M Bal 
1988     -32,874 
 
1988     -53,270 
1989   32,874 -1,647 
 
1989   53,270 -2,750 
1990   1,647 -3,952 
 
1990   2,750 -656 
1991   3,952 -5,779 
 
1991   656 -7,971 
1992   5,779 -49,825 
 
1992   7,971 -157,084 
1993   49,825 -319,326 
 
1993   157,084 -959,659 
1994   319,326 -713,017 
 
1994   959,659 -1,459,420 
1995   713,017 -895,988 
 
1995   1,459,420 -2,225,181 
1996   895,988 -622,016 
 
1996   2,225,181 -1,670,681 
1997   622,016 -1,053,436 
 
1997 9,812 1,670,681 -3,973,315 
1998   1,053,436 -1,931,733 
 
1998   3,983,127 -8,231,381 
1999   1,931,733 -599,077 
 
1999 142,789 8,231,381 -2,339,655 
2000   599,077 -629,107 
 
2000   2,482,444 -2,359,457 
2001   629,107 -3,137,518 
 
2001   2,359,457 -12,529,919 
2002   3,137,518 -4,452,890 
 
2002   12,529,919 -14,682,457 
2003 4,524 4,452,890 -2,274,775 
 
2003   14,682,457 -4,711,936 
2004   2,279,299 -2,944,073 
 
2004   4,711,936 -6,996,320 
2005   2,944,073 -1,098,274 
 
2005   6,996,320 -2,426,051 
2006   1,098,274 -3,469,556 
 
2006   2,426,051 -6,103,608 
2007   3,469,556 -4,492,386 
 
2007   6,103,608 -5,150,902 
2008   4,492,386 -4,492,386 
 
2008   5,150,902 -5,150,902 
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ANNEX E: List of Persons Interviewed and Meetings 
 
Date Meeting Name 
Monday  28 
Sept 2009   
Foreign Trade Policy 
Department (FTPD), 
MOIC 
Mr. Bounsom Phommavihane, Director General, 
Foreign Trade Policy Department 
Mr. Santisouk Phounesavath, Deputy Director, 
Multilateral Trade Policy Division, FTPD 
 
Import  and Export 
Department, MOIC 
Dr. Laohoua Cheuching, Deputy Director General, 
Import-Export Department, and Trade Officers 
 
Domestic Trade 
Department, MOIC  
Mr. Aketisack Oudomhack, Trade officer, Domestic 
Trade Department 
 Mr. Phonekeo Phengsouvanh, Domestic Trade 
Department 
 
Department  of 
Production and Trade  
Promotion, MOIC 
Mme. Anoumone Kittilath,  
Deputy Director, Department of 
Production and Trade Promotion 
 
UNDP  Ms. Phanchinda Lengsavad,  
 Head of Poverty Reduction  
unit/Assistant Resident Representative 
 
UNDP Dr. Kheungkham Keonuchan, head of  
UNIDO Operations 
 
UNDP Mr. Robert Glofcheski 
Senior Economist Advisor 
 
Tuesday 29 
Sept 2009   
Department of 
Statistics/MPI 
Dr. Samaychanh Boupha  
Director General 
Dept. of statistics (Tel. 216656, 214740) 
 
Lao Cement Co. Ltd  (Nongbone road, Vientiane, Tel: 21-412111,451116) 
 
Lao Cement Industry, Co 
Ltd  
(014 Kaysone PhomvihaneRd Sivilay Vientiane, Tel: 
21 7202 76). 
 
Wednesday 
30 Sept 2009 
Customs Department 
 
Mr. Ardsapangthong Siphandon 
Deputy Director General 
Tel. 312 810, 223 522/5; Fax 223 521 
Third floor 
Department of Intellectual 
Property, Standardization 
and Metrology in NOST: 
for TBT Enquiry Point. 
 
Mr. Latsamy, head of General Affair Divison. 020 
5698828 
(Tel. 240784/243404-5) 
 Support to the National Assembly for information 
on program to make 
Mr. Frank Boulin 
Tel: 417067 
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Lao’s laws WTO 
consistent. 
 
Thursday  
01 Oct 2009 
World Bank 
 
Mr. Richard Record  
Trade Specialist, World Bank 
 
European 
Commission 
Mrs.Khankeo Mounvong 
Programme Officer 
 
Friday 02 
Oct 2009   
Cleaner Production 
UNIDO 
Mr. Vilaisak  
National Project Coordinator 
Lao Brewery Company 
Limited 
 
Tuesday 06 
Oct 2009 
Focal Point in MOIC of 
PRSO  
 
Mr. Sirisamphanh Vorachith  
Deputy Permanent Secretary 
 
Department of Industry  Mr. Manohack Rasachack  
Deputy Director General 
 
Wednesday 
07 Oct 2009   
Vientiane Steel Industry 
 
Mr. Phisith Sayathith 
Tel:820 388, 820 377; 020 5505 289 
Email: info@vsi-group.com 
Friday 09 
Oct 2009   
Preliminary Finding 
Meeting 
Mme. Khemmani Pholsena, Vice Minister of Industry 
and Commerce, Project Executive and the project 
team of MOIC and UNDP 
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